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Objective 
This preliminary report outlines the directions of research that could be commissioned 
to improve our understanding of the governance capabilities that were involved in 
sustained growth experiences in a number of countries (mainly in Asia). These 
countries successfully transformed their economies from low to high productivity 
economies through sustained economic growth. The transformation process involved 
major institutional and governance challenges including transfers of property rights 
(to ensure that resources stay in productive hands), the acquisition of new 
technology, the imposition of discipline on emerging capitalists, and maintaining 
peace and political stability. The  research findings are intended to help low-income 
countries (particularly in Africa) understand their own contexts better and examine 
whether the key roles some states have been able to play in these transformational 
processes present relevant operational lessons that could be adapted now to help 
countries successfully build capacity to deliver growth and poverty reduction.    
 
Summary 
 
A growing body of theory and evidence suggests that the state must do more than 
create an environment for market-driven growth if markets are to deliver sustained 
increases in investment, production and employment needed to reduce poverty. 
The contemporary focus on good governance reforms in developing countries is 
based on developing the market-enhancing governance capabilities of states. If 
successful, this type of governance should make markets more efficient. However, 
the evidence in support of these reforms is poor. The cross-sectional evidence can 
be used to extract some support for the importance of market-enhancing 
governance, but we can also examine the data to derive quite different results. The 
evidence that is available is presented in this paper, and we argue that it actually 
supports the view that good governance reforms are difficult to implement in any 
developing country. Rapidly growing countries in general did not enjoy better 
market-enhancing governance conditions compared to the others. If some 
developing countries nevertheless did very well in terms of sustained convergence, 
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they must have had some other governance capabilities that allowed them to 
achieve this. 
 
We argue that these capabilities are best described as growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities. Theory and evidence suggests that growth requires 
favourable outcomes and therefore governance capabilities in at least three closely 
interrelated processes. The first involves the governance capabilities that states use 
to manage the non-market asset transfers that are endemic at early stages of 
development. The structural drivers behind non-market transfers also help to 
explain why property right stability is never achieved at early stages of 
development. Sustainable growth did not depend on the ex ante achievement of 
stable property rights, but did depend on governance capabilities that could 
manage non-market asset transfers in ways that created incentives for productive 
investment and allowed productive investors to have stable expectations about 
their future rewards. Secondly, developing countries have to adapt strategies to 
acquire technologies and learn new ways of organizing work and using knowledge. 
These learning processes take time and involve costs that have to be covered either 
by the state or private investors. By definition, this involves the creation and 
management of rents. Success or failure in rapid technology acquisition has been 
closely associated with governance capabilities that allow or prevent states 
effectively disciplining this learning process and managing the rents involved. 
Finally, sustained growth requires the maintenance of political stability in a context 
where patron-client politics is structural and difficult to change in the short run. 
Success or failure has not depended on the ability to achieve Weberian states at 
early stages of development, but has depended on governance capabilities that 
allowed states to manage political stability through patron-client politics at 
relatively low cost and without these processes excessively disrupting productive 
investment and learning. All of these governance capabilities are quite different 
from the ones identified in the market-enhancing approach. 
 
There is no conflict between the development of market-enhancing and growth-
enhancing governance, except that a one-sided and exclusive focus on the former 
can waste resources on unattainable (though highly desirable) objectives while 
creating frustration and demoralization in developing countries because true 
sustainability is not being enhanced.  
 
Deepening our understanding of these processes and developing these ideas so that 
they can be useful in the policy debate requires the development of our 
understanding in a number of areas.  
 
i) We identify three phases of governance policy in developing countries. Growth-
enhancing strategies were followed in the early years, but they were abandoned 
because the associated growth-enhancing governance capabilities were not well-
understood or developed, and sustainable growth was achieved in very few 
countries. The abandonment of growth-enhancing strategies in some countries also 
led to growth spurts (in countries like Bangladesh, Uganda, and perhaps more 
sustainably in India), even though these countries do not perform too well in terms 
of market-enhancing governance either. One area of research would be to 
understand better the differences between converging (high-growth) countries that 
are following market-led growth strategies and those (like China) that are 
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following growth strategies based on accelerated resource transfers to productive 
sectors and learning strategies. Existing data on growth in India raises questions 
about the sustainability of purely market-driven growth strategies, particularly in 
countries with even weaker technological capabilities. This part of the research 
would help to identify vulnerabilities in the growth strategies being followed by 
many of the developing countries in which DFID is working and identify policy 
areas that require attention.  
 
ii) We argue that the good governance emphasis on property right stability is based 
on a simplification of the development challenge. Stable property rights are very 
desirable but are not immediately achievable in most developing countries. The 
critical development challenge is for developing countries to have the governance 
capacity to manage this instability and ensure that productive sectors enjoy the 
stability of expectations required for high-value investments. There is little explicit 
analysis or identification in the literature of the governance capabilities that 
allowed the steering of non-market asset transfers in developing countries towards 
productive or unproductive outcomes. A proposed study could build on case 
studies of a number of countries, including South Korea, China, Vietnam, India, 
Bangladesh, and others to identify the governance characteristics that allowed or 
prevented growth. Are there general characteristics of these capabilities? The 
significant differences between successful countries suggests that there are no 
general institutional characteristics that all successful countries possessed but 
rather that they used different institutional mechanisms to achieve some common 
outcomes. An important reason why institutional mechanisms have differed is that 
they were embedded in very different political and historical contexts given 
differences in political organizations and structures. 
 
iii) Learning strategies also demonstrate a great diversity across countries, using 
formal institutionally created opportunities and compulsions in some cases, but 
relying on informal business-government relations in others. A critical research 
goal here is to identify and classify different strategies for sustainable and 
successful technology acquisition, and the associated political and institutional 
capabilities that allowed or prevented their implementation. This classification may 
help to design viable governance reforms in different contexts that differ in terms 
of initial political and organizational conditions. Technology acquisition and 
upgrading is likely to become an increasingly important issue as some of the rapid 
growers in the market-driven camp (like Bangladesh and Uganda) run out of easy 
labour-intensive technologies and face growing competition in international 
markets from countries like China that have viable technology upgrading 
strategies. 
 
iv) A third area of research that is very closely interdependent with the others is to 
look more closely at the political stabilization processes in developing countries 
that inevitably have to use and rely on patron-client structures and off-budget 
finances. Our argument is that the processes of political stabilization reveal 
important features of the ‘political settlement’, and in particular the nature of the 
patron-client networks that are used to achieve political stabilization.  
 
These patron-client networks in turn impact on the viability of different strategies 
of managing non-market asset transfers and specific technology acquisition 
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strategies. To be viable, productive strategies in terms of managing assets and 
technology acquisition have to be compatible with the constraints imposed by the 
rent seeking strategies of participants in patron-client networks.  
 
 
For instance, some types of patron-client networks may rule out the feasibility of 
specific technology acquisition strategies, but may allow other types. Identifying 
the growth-enhancing governance capabilities that can be feasibly developed in a 
particular country therefore needs to begin with an analysis of the political 
settlement and how the political process works through the existing patron-client 
networks. There may be asset management and technology acquisition strategies 
that are viable in this context, provided appropriate governance capabilities are 
developed, but it may also be that feasible improvements require a change in the 
organization of political networks, a task that is explicitly political and internal to 
the politics of the developing country. Nevertheless, even here, analysis can help to 
open up important debates within the developing country and provide analytical 
frameworks to structure that debate in ways that are more useful than the good 
governance framework.  
 
The methodology proposed does not identify any simple killer variables that can 
explain why ‘political will’ emerges in a particular country to carry out 
transformative changes that lead to sustainable growth paths. Sustainable growth 
strategies can differ widely in terms of the mix of political stabilization 
expenditures, the pace and pattern of primitive accumulation, and the technology 
acquisition strategies followed. Success only requires that each of these processes 
is viable and achieves positive outcomes. Not everyone has to grow at Chinese or 
even South Korean rates to be successful. The problem is that when some or all of 
these processes in a particular country are not sustainable, high rates of growth can 
turn out to be a relatively brief ‘growth spurt’ rather than a sustainable growth 
path.  
 
An examination of political stabilization can help to identify the patron-client 
networks in a country that are implicated in the two other processes that we have 
identified as important in determining the appropriate growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities of a state. The juxtaposition of specific patron-client 
networks with the institutions of political stabilization, property right protection 
and technology acquisition provide critical information about the sustainability of 
each of these processes and allow us to reach a judgement about the growth-
enhancing governance capabilities of the state. This approach can potentially help 
us design somewhat better institutions and strategies to improve outcomes in each 
of the processes that we believe are important for the sustainability of growth. 
 
Research and knowledge on these issues is still relatively thin despite many case 
studies on growth being available for different countries. Rodrik’s team working 
on the deep determinants of growth using analytical narratives is one of a very few 
groups working on consistent case studies (Rodrik 2003). However, their analytical 
framework is different from the one suggested here, which is based on looking at 
the interdependence of three different processes relevant for sustaining growth. 
The analytical narrative approach can be usefully expanded to look at the three 
interdependent processes that we have identified as important, using a number of 
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comparative cases to initiate a broader case study approach to identify growth-
enhancing governance conditions. The selection of these countries would be from 
Asia and Africa to deepen our knowledge of Asian transformations and to apply 
these insights to construct a better mapping of African political economy. 
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While most economists would agree that governance is one of the critical factors 
determining the growth prospects of countries, there is considerable controversy about 
governance priorities and the types of governance capabilities that are critical. These 
disagreements are related to fundamental disagreements on the role of markets versus 
other social, political and technological characteristics that need to be fulfilled for 
sustainable growth to take off. The contemporary good governance agenda is based 
largely on governance capabilities that are required to create the conditions for 
markets to be efficient. While these are important and desirable conditions, we argue 
that they are second order conditions, in the sense that without state capacities to 
promote the technological, social and political conditions required for sustainable 
growth, market conditions for efficiency are on their own insufficient and ultimately 
unsustainable.  
 
The good governance agenda is also misguided in believing that significant 
improvements in market efficiency conditions are possible in developing countries. 
There are a number of critical structural features of developing countries that prevent 
the achievement of significant progress on the good governance front. These factors 
make the good governance agenda doubly problematic: it sets many developing 
countries goals they cannot achieve, and in addition, even if they could have been 
achieved, these goals are not sufficient to ensure sustainable growth. The task of this 
paper is to outline some of the governance issues that we already know about, and 
identify other areas where more research is necessary to assist policy.  
 
1. Three phases in the history of governance and growth policies  
It is useful to recall that the consensus on economic policy and appropriate 
governance capacities for developing countries has gone through radical changes over 
the last fifty years. In the first phase of development strategy in the immediate post-
war years, economic policy was much more concerned with upgrading the 
technological capacities of developing countries by accelerating the setting up of new 
industries and assisting technology acquisition. Not much attention was given to the 
governance capacities appropriate for achieving these goals, and the results were 
generally poor.  
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A second phase of development policy dates roughly from the 1980s when structural 
adjustment began to be promoted precisely because previous strategies had resulted in 
serious budgetary crises in many developing countries. Rent seeking, corruption and 
other governance issues now became policy concerns, but the expectation was that 
liberalization would resolve these governance issues by removing the incentives for 
rent seeking. The results of this phase of policy were, if anything, even more 
disappointing, with no discernible improvements in either the growth prospects of 
developing countries or their governance conditions.  
 
The third and current phase of development and governance policy followed from 
these experiences. It placed a governance-related policy agenda at the centre of 
development policy: the good governance agenda. The emergence and relevance of 
the new governance policy and the gaps in our understanding can be better understood 
by placing it in its historical context.  
 
Phase 1. Accelerated transformation strategies that underplayed governance 
The first phase of growth and governance policies describes the economic strategies 
adopted by most developing countries from their decolonization at different stages of 
the last fifty years to sometime in the early 1980s. The concern of most developing 
countries and international agencies during this period was to accelerate the creation 
of growth-enhancing sectors in developing countries. However, they failed to give 
much attention to the development of governance capabilities appropriate for the 
effective implementation of these strategies.  
 
The new discipline of development economics emerged in the years following the 
Second World War and the end of empire. Although there were a few liberal voices 
advocating free markets for developing countries from the outset, a broadly shared 
consensus of the time was that developing countries needed to actively promote their 
productive sectors. It is important to remember where this concern came from. Most 
developing countries had performed very poorly under the free trade regimes imposed 
on them by colonial powers. Not only did most non-settler colonies have virtual free 
trade during their colonial period (with very low or zero tariff protection for domestic 
industries), they also had virtually free capital movements as there were very few or 
no restrictions on capital inflow from the colonial power or on profit repatriation.  
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 However, in the non-settler colonies these free trade regimes had not resulted in 
industrialization or prosperity. Rather, they had served to provide markets for the 
manufactures of the colonial powers. Nor did unrestricted capital movements and 
unfettered profit repatriation result in much inward investment by European countries 
to take advantage of cheap labour in the colonies. Since large colonies like India had 
stable administrations and relatively stable property rights, it did not cross the minds 
of post-colonial policy-makers that the concerns of later governance theorists could 
have been a major constraint preventing the industrialization of their countries. 
 
Instead, the focus of development strategy in the post-colonial period was to address 
the backwardness of the newly independent countries by using state policies to 
directly assist the creation of new capitalists in industry (but also in other sectors) and 
to assist them in acquiring new technologies rapidly. This involved policies of 
changing internal relative prices to assist resource and asset acquisition by emerging 
capitalists, followed by a variety of policies to protect them from immediate 
international competition so that they could improve their productivity and thereby 
eventually become internationally competitive.  
 
The early development strategists were probably right to believe that the later 
concerns of good governance theorists such as improvements in the rule of law, anti-
corruption or democratization were not the central governance issues that would assist 
the implementation of their programmes. However, in virtually every developing 
country attempting these strategies there was little if any discussion of the governance 
capabilities they would actually require to effectively implement their growth 
strategies. The governance discussion that did take place came from the 
modernization school that tried to justify the lack of democracy and the presence of 
corruption in many of the developing countries that had become Cold War allies of 
the US during this period.  
 
The argument was that authoritarian regimes were likely to be more successful in 
managing the political and institutional challenges of modernization (Huntington 
1968). This was because authoritarian governments were better suited to managing 
the conflicts over rapidly emerging capitalists and the maintenance of high rates of 
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investment. As for corruption, it was argued that post-colonial states were not yet 
fully geared to the needs of a market economy, and some corruption would allow 
emerging capitalists to create incentives for the state to work for them more 
efficiently. In a period of deepening Cold War, the unstated assumption in many 
western discussions was that strong authoritarian regimes were necessary to protect 
these countries from possible communist insurgencies. While these arguments 
provided some cover for particularly unsavoury western allies, the underlying analysis 
was weak because many authoritarian and corrupt regimes failed to develop. 
 
Critically, there was no discussion within developing countries about the governance 
capabilities required to effectively implement the different growth strategies they 
were following. Not surprisingly, success and failure were accidental to pre-existing 
governance capabilities that allowed some countries to effectively implement these 
strategies and rapidly grow, while most others had at most a temporary burst of output 
growth but because their productivity growth was low, they did not achieve 
international competitiveness and the growth strategies became increasingly unviable.  
 
The results of this first phase of post-colonial growth strategies were therefore very 
mixed. A few countries did break out of poverty in a sustained way by the late 1960s. 
These countries, like South Korea and Taiwan, emerged by the late 1960s as 
emerging economic giants (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). A number of other countries 
like Brazil, Pakistan and India initially achieved much higher growth rates through 
import-substituting industrialization compared to their growth rates in the first half of 
the twentieth century. But in these countries productivity growth in the emerging 
industrial sectors was not high enough and there was a growing perception by the 
mid-sixties that these strategies were becoming unsustainable. But most worrying was 
a larger group of countries, many of them in Africa, where import-substituting 
industrialization resulted in much more limited growth and industrialization. The 
failure to generate productivity growth in these countries resulted in a serious crisis of 
public finances as subsidies were absorbed in a large number of schemes that did not 
promise to generate any viable growth.   
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Phase 1. Post-war development policy focus on
i) increasing investment and infrastructure,
ii) creating new capitalists by encouraging rapid asset 
transfers (the modernization thesis),
iii) protection of emerging capitalists using subsidies and 
tariffs to assist catching-up (infant industry protection)
Politics and institutions underplayed:
Authoritarian regimes tolerated on the grounds that 
they allowed high investment rates, accelerated the 
creation of new capitalists and kept communists at bay 
(variants of the modernization thesis)
A few dramatic successes 
in East Asia (such as 
Taiwan and South Korea) 
but many more disastrous 
failures in Asia and Africa 
with authoritarian regimes 
creating unproductive 
elites and infant industries 
that refused to mature
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 Figure 1 Growth-promoting policies that ignored growth-enhancing governance capabilitiesre 1 summarizes the strategy and governance combination that characterized the 
phase of development strategies in developing countries. The results, while very 
uraging for a small number of countries, were not widely-enough shared for this 
egy to survive in many developing countries, or receive the continued support of 
national agencies. With the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold 
 imperatives of providing support to undemocratic and corrupt regimes also began 
ddenly disappear. 
se 2. Market-promoting strategies with governance reform as a by-product 
emergence of a second consensus on economic reform and governance amongst a 
 number of development theorists and practitioners emerged around the 1980s. 
 Toye described this as the ‘development counterrevolution’ (Toye 1987). The 
 focus of theory and policy was to show that far from improving the prospects of 
loping countries; misguided interventions had created a labyrinth of rent seeking 
corruption, and pulled these countries far below their developmental potential. 
policy response was a radical one. In addition to standard liberal prescriptions 
 as trade liberalization, a significant reduction in budget deficits had to be 
eved in developing countries and subsidies had to be cut back across the board.  
new consensus emerged as a response to the failure of many state-led 
strialization policies in developing countries that had only resulted in the 
gence of large non-performing industrial sectors in many of these countries by 
970s. But instead of examining what was different about these cases of failure 
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compared to the successful developers who had followed similar economic policies, 
the new consensus argued that the economic problems of these countries were mainly 
due to their attempt to correct market failures through state interventions. It concluded 
that the costs of state failure associated with interventions were significantly greater 
than the costs of market failure they had set out to correct. It would have been better 
not to intervene, and government policy should only have focused on making markets 
more efficient (Krueger 1990).  
 
While governance reform was not yet at the centre of the reform agenda, reforming 
the state was an essential component of the structural adjustment programme. 
However, it was believed that the reform of the state would follow from and be 
achieved through the structural adjustment itself. These ideas followed from the 
development of what came to be known as new political economy. This school was 
the result of many related theoretical contributions (Krueger 1974; Posner 1975; 
Bhagwati 1982; Bardhan 1984; Colander 1984; Alt and Shepsle 1990; Lal and Myint 
1996; Bates 2001).  
 
The dominant argument of the time that emerged from this growing literature was that 
the multiplication of rents in the economy as a result of the policies of the 
interventionist states of the sixties and seventies resulted in turn in these states being 
captured by vested interests. Rent seekers used the state to capture rents for 
themselves at the expense of the whole economy. While the state in this analysis was 
clearly a problem, the new agenda was to indirectly reform the state through 
liberalization and structural adjustment. As rents disappeared, the theoretical 
expectation was that rent seeking and state capture would decline in proportion. 
Governance reform would therefore be achieved indirectly through the structural 
adjustment itself.  
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Phase 2. 1980s development policy focus on
neo-liberal policies to cut back subsidies across the 
board to reduce inflation as a precondition for market-
led growth  (structural adjustment )
Political reform expected to follow from the economic 
reforms: ‘Right-sizing’ the state expected to reduce rent 
seeking and corruption (neo-liberal ‘new political 
economy’ and rent-seeking theories)
Although inflation was 
reduced, very poor results 
for growth, poverty 
reduction, and rent 
seeking, particularly in 
Africa and other poorly 
performing countries 
where the main effect was 
often economic recession
The results o
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 igure 2 Structural adjustment attempting indirect governance reformf structural adjustment policies in the eighties were generally very poor. 
ollowed in many African countries, and growth was poor in other 
t adopted these policies. More worrying was that despite significant 
 and cutbacks in subsidies, together with privatization programmes in 
ping countries, there was little apparent reduction in rent seeking 
 almost every country where liberalization was carried out, there 
be an increase in corruption and rent seeking (Harriss-White 1996; 
 and White 1996). The realization that market-promoting governance 
 the part of the state required specific attention led to the third, and 
of governance approaches.  
ket-promoting governance as the driver of market strategies 
formance of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s led to the 
 a new focus on the role of the state to ensure the conditions necessary 
conomies to work efficiently. The development of New Institutional 
ad brought to the fore economic theories that identified governance 
at states needed to have to create the conditions for low transaction cost 
rkets. In addition, the poor performance in the 1980s and the growing 
 persistent poverty in developing countries also brought to the fore the 
of pro-poor service delivery as a necessary capability for developing 
. The convergence of these different perspectives led to the emergence 
licy priorities for governance in developing countries that has come to be 
 good governance agenda.  
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Many of these governance conditions were also desirable on their own: conditions 
like low corruption, democratic accountability, the rule of law and pro-poor service 
delivery. With the end of the Cold War, many constituencies, including civil society 
in developing countries had been demanding these conditions in developing countries. 
The coming together of a large number of different constituencies behind the good 
governance agenda explains its impressive influence and hold in the development 
community. But while many people in developing countries demand good governance 
as an end, the governance policy agenda sees it as a set of preconditions to enable 
market-driven development to take off.  
 
The new consensus builds on the earlier commitment to liberalization and market-
driven growth, but now the development of good governance capabilities has come to 
occupy the heart of development strategy. As the good governance approach began to 
be adopted as the mainstream development agenda in the 1990s, a few countries had 
already been enjoying accelerated growth since the mid-1980s by finding niches in 
increasingly integrated global value chains. Most of these growth experiences were, 
however, based on already existing comparative advantages that some developing 
countries had developed. On the other hand, economic performance in many of the 
poorest developing countries remains low, and growth in others is based on 
vulnerable low technology sectors and commodities that are sensitive to terms of trade 
changes and are unlikely to display the growth in productivity that is necessary to 
achieve sustainable improvements in living standards.  
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Phase 3. 1990s economic policy remains focussed on 
market-led economic growth (based on already existing 
comparative advantage) (deepening liberalization)
Political and institutional policy to focus state capacities 
on market-promoting governance: reforms of property 
rights, rule of law, anti-corruption, and democratization, 
combined with pro-poor service delivery (good 
governance reforms and the service-delivery state)
Some developing 
countries achieve 
moderate growth through 
low-technology exports 
but many perform poorly. 
The most successful 
developers like China or 
Vietnam do not conform to 
many characteristics of 
the good governance and 
service-delivery models
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 igure 3 The good governance agenda as a market-promoting governance strategyf historical survey highlights a number of critical observations. Governance 
ies are closely connected to economic development strategies that states are 
g. The strategies many developing countries followed in the sixties and 
 are fundamentally different from the ones they are following now. There 
cesses and failures in each of our three phases and these can be related to the 
 mismatch of the requirements of the economic strategy being followed and 
rnance capabilities that were required for effectively implementing it. To 
 this critical observation, and to draw out the research and policy 
ons, we will first discuss the theory and evidence supporting the good 
ce agenda. We will then discuss the theory and evidence supporting a more 
 view of governance, and the research that needs to be done to deepen our 
ding of these issues. 
y and evidence supporting the good governance agenda. 
inant analysis of good governance as a market-promoting governance 
that emerged in the third phase argued that these capacities were essential for 
ing efficient markets and restricting the activities of states to the provision of 
 public goods so as to minimize rent seeking and government failure. The 
ailure of many developing country states that emerged during the first phase 
pment strategy is explained by the attempts of their states to do too much. 
ulted in the unleashing of unproductive rent seeking activities and the 
 out of productive market ones. Empirical support in favour of this argument 
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is based on cross-sectional data on governance in developing countries that shows that 
in general, countries with better governance defined in these terms performed better.  
 
Box 1. Are efficient markets sufficient for development? 
 
The importance of markets in fostering and enabling economic development is 
not in question. Economic development is likely to be more rapid if markets 
mediating resource allocation (in any country) become more efficient.  
 
The policy debate is rather about  
i) the extent to which markets can be made efficient in developing countries, 
and  
ii) whether maximizing the efficiency of markets (and certainly maximizing 
their efficiency to the degree that is achievable in developing countries) is 
sufficient to maximize the pace of development.  
 
Heterodox growth-promoting approaches to governance have argued that markets are 
inherently inefficient in developing countries and even with the best political will, 
structural characteristics of the economy ensure that market efficiency will remain 
low till a substantial degree of development is achieved. Given the structural 
limitations of markets in developing countries, successful development requires 
critical governance capacities of states to accelerate private and public accumulation 
and ensure productivity growth.  
 
In support of these arguments, heterodox economists point to the evidence of the 
successful East Asian developers of the last five decades, where governance 
capacities typically amounted to a lot more than the capacities necessary for ensuring 
efficient markets. In fact, in terms of the market-enhancing conditions prioritized by 
the good governance approach, East Asian states often performed rather poorly. 
Instead, they had effective institutions that could accelerate growth in conditions 
characterized by technological backwardness and high transaction costs. The 
alternative approach identifies the importance of a different set of governance 
capabilities that can be described as growth-enhancing governance. Growth-
enhancing governance should not be confused with interventionism. Promoting 
markets also requires intervention and growth can only be promoted through actively 
developing markets and the capacities of countries to sell in global markets.  
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The distinction between market-promoting and growth-promoting governance is not 
necessarily very stark and it is not necessary for policy-makers to choose between two 
dramatically different strategies. It has been unfortunate that a somewhat artificial 
chasm emerged between these positions with the growing dominance of the liberal 
economic consensus of the 1980s. Indeed there may be important complementarities 
between the two sets of governance requirements in specific areas, provided these can 
be properly identified and prioritized for policy attention. Our intention in reviewing 
the evidence is to show that market-promoting governance as a general goal for 
governance policy is a) difficult to achieve to any significant extent in developing 
countries and b) is insufficient as a condition for ensuring sustained economic growth 
in developing countries. We will then review the evidence to see what we know about 
growth-enhancing governance and the policy implications that follow from this 
evidence. 
 
Box 2. Market-enhancing versus growth-enhancing governance 
 
Good governance reforms aim to promote governance capabilities that are 
market-enhancing, in the sense that they aim to make markets more efficient 
by reducing transaction costs for players in the market. There is no question that 
to the extent that these reforms can be implemented they will improve market 
outcomes in developing countries.  
 
However, there are structural problems that prevent significant implementation. 
Moreover, market efficiency does not address significant problems of catching 
up that require governance capabilities to assist developing countries move 
rapidly up the technology ladder. 
 
Growth-enhancing governance capabilities are capabilities that allow 
developing countries to navigate through the property right instability of early 
development, manage and discipline technological catching up, and maintain 
political stability in a context of endemic and structural reliance on patron-client 
politics.  
 
While both sets of governance capabilities are important, the first is not 
significantly achievable in poor countries and an excessive focus on these 
market-enhancing capabilities takes our eye off the critical growth-enhancing 
capabilities that can actually sustain and accelerate development. Ironically, 
effective growth-enhancing governance capabilities create the preconditions for 
achieving good governance and market-enhancing governance capabilities. 
 
The consensus behind the good governance agenda draws heavily on the contributions 
of the New Institutional Economics that pointed out that efficient markets require 
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elaborate governance structures. The goal of governance should therefore be to 
enhance the market-enhancing governance capabilities of the state (North 1990; 
Kauffman, et al. 1999). The theoretical links identified in New Institutional 
Economics that explain economic stagnation are summarized in figure 4.  
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 Figure 4 Theoretical linkages in the good governance analysilink in all market-focused approaches to development is link 1 in 
ic stagnation is explained primarily by inefficient markets. High 
re simply a technical description of inefficient markets. These high 
are in turn explained by link 2: weak and contested property rights 
state interventions. In the second phase of growth-governance 
 of economic policy was limited to link 2 in figure 4 and that too, on 
necessary state interventions as a way of improving the efficiency of 
scussed earlier, the expectation was that these reforms would suffice 
more efficient through link 1, as well as feed back to reduce rent 
uption through link 3 in figure 4 but operating in the reverse 
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The good governance agenda emerged in the third phase of governance policy to 
develop an integrated analysis of market efficiency (Khan 2004). For the first time, 
the argument was that unless all the links in figure 4 were simultaneously addressed, 
market inefficiency would not improve. The logic was that rents and interventions 
could not be reduced unless rent seeking and corruption were directly addressed, and 
in turn, these could not be significantly tackled unless the privileges of minorities that 
harmed the majority could be challenged through accountability and democratization. 
The policy implication was an integrated reform agenda summarized in figure 5. 
 
The first theoretical difference compared to earlier approaches was the recognition 
that transaction costs could be high not only because of government interventions, but 
also because governments lacked the capacity to reduce transaction costs by 
effectively protecting property rights and enforcing contracts. Progress required an 
integrated approach on links 3 and 4, to fight corruption and rent seeking that 
disrupted property rights and contracts, and to ensure the accountability that was the 
only way to fight corruption and rent seeking. A further theoretical development was 
the idea that pro-poor service delivery was a way not only of directly attacking 
poverty, but also of empowering the majority and creating expectations that could 
only be met through greater accountability.  
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 Table 1 shows that all the main policy planks of contemporary governance and 
economic policy reform strategies are derived from the links shown in figure 5. The 
contemporary reforms to improve accountability and pro-poor service delivery (links 
4 and 5 in figure 5) are the theoretical basis of reforms shown in column 1 in table 1. 
Policies to counter corruption and rent seeking that are becoming increasingly 
important in World Bank strategies are derived from link 3, and shown in column 2 of 
table 1. Finally, policies to strengthen property rights and the rule of law are derived 
from link 2 and shown in column 3 of table 1. 
 
Table 1 Contemporary governance priorities and their links to theory 
 
PRSP, PGBS (in some 
countries),
Accountability 
Reforms, 
Decentralization. 
Policies to Improve 
Accountability of 
Government
(arrows 4 and 5 in 
previous figure)
Anti-corruption 
policies, Liberalization, 
WTO restrictions on 
subsidies, IMF fiscal 
requirements 
Policies to Counter 
Corruption and Rent 
Seeking
(arrow 3 in previous 
figure)
Policies to improve rule 
of law, reduce 
expropriation risk, 
strengthen judiciaries
Policies to Stabilize 
Property Rights across 
the board
(arrow 2 in previous 
figure)
The importance of the good governance perspective in informing contemporary 
development policy and discourse cannot be overemphasized. A powerful way of 
evaluating the appropriateness of the relationships between growth and governance 
asserted in the good governance agenda is to look more carefully at some of the data 
and evidence that is used by proponents of the agenda to support the programme.  
 
The Empirical Evidence  
The market-enhancing view of governance appears to explain the observation of poor 
performance in many developing countries attempting import-substituting 
industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. Market-enhancing governance capabilities 
were poor in these countries, as was their long-term economic performance. However, 
the test that is required is to see if countries that scored higher in terms of market-
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enhancing governance characteristics actually did better in terms of convergence with 
advanced countries. When we conduct such a test we find that the evidence 
supporting the market-enhancing view of governance is weak, even using the largely 
subjective indicators of governance constructed by researchers broadly sympathetic to 
the theoretical conclusions of the good governance analysis.  
 
We find that this data tells us that while poorly performing developing countries did 
indeed fail to meet the governance criteria identified in the market-enhancing view of 
governance, so did high-growth developing countries. These observations are fairly 
systematic, and hold for all the governance indicators and time periods for which we 
have any evidence. The evidence suggests that it may actually be difficult for any 
developing country, regardless of its growth performance, to achieve the governance 
conditions required for efficient markets. This does not mean that market-enhancing 
conditions are irrelevant, but it does mean that we need to qualify some of the claims 
made for prioritizing market-enhancing governance reforms in developing countries. 
 
Making sense of this data is particularly important since an extensive academic 
literature has used the same data to establish a positive relationship between market-
enhancing governance conditions and economic performance (Knack and Keefer 
1995; Mauro 1995; Barro 1996; Clague, et al. 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Johnson, et al. 1998; Hall and Jones 1999; Kauffman, et al. 1999; Lambsdorff 2005). 
This literature typically finds a positive relationship between the two, supporting the 
hypothesis that an improvement in market-enhancing governance conditions will 
promote growth and accelerate convergence with advanced countries. The studies use 
a number of indices of market-enhancing governance. In particular, they use data 
provided by Stephen Knack and the IRIS centre at Maryland University, as well as 
more recent data provided by Kaufmann’s team and available on the World Bank’s 
website. If market-enhancing governance were relevant for explaining economic 
growth, we would expect the quality of market-enhancing governance at the 
beginning of a period (of say ten years) to have an effect on the economic growth 
achieved during that period.  
 
However, the Knack-IRIS data set is only available for most countries from 1984 and 
the Kaufmann-World Bank data set from 1996 onwards. We have to be careful to test 
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the role of market-enhancing governance by using the governance index at the 
beginning of a period of economic performance to see if differences in market-
enhancing governance explain the subsequent difference in performance between 
countries. This is important, as a correlation between governance indicators at the end 
of a period and economic performance during that period could be picking up the 
reverse direction of causality, where rising per capita incomes result in an 
improvement in market-enhancing governance conditions.  
 
There are good theoretical reasons to expect market-enhancing governance to improve 
as per capita incomes increase (as more resources become available in the budget for 
securing property rights, running democratic systems, policing human rights and so 
on). This reverses the direction of causality between growth and governance. Thus, 
for the Knack-IRIS data, the earliest decade of growth that we can examine would be 
1980–90, and even here we have to be careful to remember that the governance data 
that we have is for a year almost halfway through the growth period. The Knack-IRIS 
indices are more appropriate for testing the significance of governance for economic 
growth during 1990–2003. The World Bank data on governance begins in 1996, and 
therefore these can at best be used for examining growth during 1990–2003, keeping 
in mind once again that these indices are for a year halfway through the period of 
growth being considered.  
 
Stephen Knack’s IRIS team at the University of Maryland compile their indices using 
country risk assessments based on the responses of relevant constituencies and expert 
opinion (IRIS-3 2000). These provide measures of market-enhancing governance 
quality for a wide set of countries from the early 1980s onwards. This data set 
provides indices for a number of key variables that measure the performance of states 
in providing market-enhancing governance. The five indices in this data set are for  
1. Corruption in government 
2. Rule of law  
3. Bureaucratic quality  
4. Repudiation of government contracts and  
5. Expropriation risk  
These indices provide a measure of the degree to which governance is capable of 
reducing the relevant transaction costs that are considered necessary for efficient 
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markets. The IRIS data set then aggregates these indices into a single ‘property rights 
index’ that ranges from 0 (the poorest conditions for market efficiency) to 50 (the best 
conditions). This index therefore measures a range of market-enhancing governance 
conditions and is very useful (within the standard limitations of all subjective data 
sets) for testing the significance of market-enhancing governance conditions for 
economic development. Annual data are available from 1984 for most countries.  
 
A second data set that has become very important for testing the role of market-
enhancing governance comes from Kaufmann’s team (Kaufmann, et al. 2005) and is 
available on the World Bank’s website (World Bank 2005a). This data aggregates a 
large number of indices available in other data sources into six broad governance 
indicators. These are: 
1. Voice and Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights 
2. Political Instability and Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or 
changes in, government, including terrorism 
3. Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the 
quality of public service delivery 
4. Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
5. Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
6. Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture. 
 
We have divided the countries for which data are available into three groups. 
“Advanced countries” are high-income countries using the World Bank’s 
classification with the exception of two small oil economies (Kuwait and the UAE), 
which we classify as developing countries. This is because although they have high 
levels of per capita income from oil sales, they have low capacities of producing their 
own wealth compared to other high-income countries. From the perspective of 
understanding the relationship between governance and growth, the small number of 
developing countries that have enjoyed significant natural resource windfalls should 
really be classified as developing countries. We also divide the group of developing 
countries into a high and low growth group. Convergence is the best and easiest 
criteria for separating developing countries into high and low growth groups. 
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“Diverging developing countries” are ones whose per capita GDP growth rate is 
lower than the median growth rate of the advanced country group, and “converging 
developing countries” are ones whose per capita GDP growth rate is higher than the 
median advanced country rate.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the available data for the 1980s from the Knack-IRIS dataset. For 
the decade of the 1980s, the earliest property right index available in this dataset for 
most countries is for 1984. Table 3 shows data from the same source for the 1990s. 
Tables 4–9 summarize the data for the 1990s using the six governance indices from 
the Kaufmann-World Bank data set. Figures 6–13 show the same data in graphical 
form. These tables and plots show some remarkable patterns across all the indices and 
demonstrate that the role of market-enhancing governance conditions in explaining 
differences in growth rates within developing countries is at best very weak.  
 
Box 3. What the data tells us  
 
i) There is virtually no difference between the median property rights index 
between converging and diverging developing countries 
 
ii) The range of governance observed in converging and diverging developing 
countries almost entirely overlaps 
 
iii) The positive slope of the regression line in the pooled data is therefore 
misleading and  
 
iv) The market-enhancing governance indicators do not help to identify the 
critical governance differences between converging and diverging developing 
countries. 
 
First, there is virtually no difference between the median property rights index 
between converging and diverging developing countries (particularly given the 
relative coarseness of this index and the fact that for most of our data, the governance 
indicators are for a year halfway through the growth period). Secondly, the range of 
variation of this index for converging and diverging countries almost entirely 
overlaps. The absence of any clear separation between converging and diverging 
developing countries in terms of market-enhancing governance conditions casts doubt 
on the robustness of the econometric results referred to earlier that find market-
enhancing governance conditions have had a significant effect on economic growth.  
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 Third, for all the indices of governance we have available, the data suggest a very 
weak positive relationship between the quality of governance and economic growth. 
The sign of the relationship is as the market-enhancing governance view requires, but 
the weakness of the relationship demands a closer look at the underlying data. This 
demonstrates that the positive relationship depends to a great extent on a large number 
of advanced countries having high scores on market-enhancing governance (the 
countries in blue in Figures 6–13) and the bulk of developing countries being low-
growth and low scoring on market-enhancing governance (the countries in red in 
Figures 6–13). However, if we only look at these countries, we are unable to say 
anything about the direction of causality as we have good theoretical reasons to 
expect market-enhancing governance to improve in countries with high per capita 
incomes. The critical countries for establishing the direction of causality are the 
converging developing countries (the countries in green in Figures 6–13). By and 
large, these countries do not have significantly better market-enhancing governance 
scores than diverging developing countries. This is particularly striking when we use 
the Knack-IRIS data on aggregate property rights for the 1990s, which is the only 
period and data set for which we have a governance indicator at the beginning of a 
relatively long period of growth.  
 
Finally, the policy implications of these observations are rather important. Given the 
large degree of overlap in the market-enhancing governance scores achieved by 
converging and diverging developing countries, we need to significantly qualify the 
claim made in much of the governance literature that an improvement in market-
enhancing governance quality in diverging countries will lead to a significant 
improvement in their growth performance. These conclusions are often derived 
mechanically from the small positive slope of regression lines, without looking at the 
weak relationship or the distribution of developing countries in the way we have done.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Market-Enhancing Governance: Composite Property Rights Index  
(Knack-IRIS dataset) and Economic Growth 1980-90 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
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Number of Countries  21 52 12 
Median Property Rights 
Index 1984 45.1 22.5 27.8 
Observed range of Property 
Rights Index 25.1 – 49.6 9.4 – 39.2 16.4 – 37.0 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1980-90 2.2 -1.0 3.5 
The IRIS Property Rights Index can range from a low of 0 for the worst governance 
conditions to a high of 50 for the best conditions. 
Sources: IRIS-3 (2000), World Bank (2005b). 
 
 
 
Table 3. Market-Enhancing Governance: Composite Property Rights Index  
(Knack-IRIS dataset) and Economic Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Property Rights 
Index 1990 47.0 25.0 23.7 
Observed range of Property 
Rights Index 32.3 – 50.0 10 – 38.3 9.5 – 40.0 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 
0.4 3.0 
The IRIS Property Rights Index can range from a low of 0 for the worst governance 
conditions to a high of 50 for the best conditions. 
Sources: IRIS-3 (2000), World Bank (2005b). 
 
Table 4. Market-Enhancing Governance: Voice and Accountability 
(Kaufmann-World Bank dataset) and Economic Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Voice and 
Accountability Index 1996 1.5 -0.4 -0.3 
Observed range of Voice and 
Accountability Index 0.4 – 1.8 -1.5 – 1.1 -1.7 – 1.4 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 
0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b). 
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Table 5. Market-Enhancing Governance: Political Instability and Violence 
(Kaufmann-World Bank dataset) and Economic Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Political Instability 
and Violence Index 1996 1.2 -0.4 0.0 
Observed range of Instability 
and Violence Index -0.5 – 1.6 -2.8 – 1.1 -2.7 – 1.0 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 
0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b). 
 
Table 6. Market-Enhancing Governance: Government Effectiveness 
(Kaufmann-World Bank dataset) and Economic Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Government 
Effectiveness Index 1996 1.9 -0.5 -0.2 
Observed range of Govt 
Effectiveness Index 0.6 – 2.5 -2.1 – 0.8 -2.2 – 1.8 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 
0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b). 
 
Table 7. Market-Enhancing Governance: Regulatory Quality 
(Kaufmann-World Bank dataset) and Economic Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Regulatory Quality 
Index 1996 1.5 -0.1 0.2 
Observed range of 
Regulatory Quality Index 0.8 – 2.3 -2.4 – 1.2 -2.9 – 2.1 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 
0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b). 
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Table 8. Market-Enhancing Governance: Rule of Law 
(Kaufmann-World Bank dataset) and Economic Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Rule of Law Index 
1996 1.9 -0.4 -0.3 
Observed range of Rule of 
Law Index 0.8 – 2.2 -1.8 – 1.1 -2.2 – 1.7 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 
0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b). 
 
Table 9. Market-Enhancing Governance: Control of Corruption 
(Kaufmann-World Bank dataset) and Economic Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Control of 
Corruption Index 1996 1.8 -0.4 -0.3 
Observed range of Control of 
Corruption Index 0.4 – 2.2 -2.0 – 0.8 -1.7 – 1.5 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 
0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. Sources: World Bank (2005a), World Bank (2005b). 
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Figure 13 Corruption and growth 1990-2003 
Clearly, there are significant differences in growth rates between developing 
countries, and these suggest significant differences in the efficiency of resource 
allocation and use. Moreover, we agree with the general premise of institutional and 
governance policy that these differences are very likely to be related to significant 
differences in governance capabilities between converging and diverging developing 
countries. Based on Khan (2004), figure 14 summarizes the data plots in figures 6–13, 
and also shows what we may be missing by using the data in a particular way. The 
data suggests that differences in market-enhancing governance capabilities are not 
significant between converging and diverging countries, and that the relationships 
within the data may actually be telling us something about the importance of other 
imensions of governance capabilities that could explain differences in growth 
erformance.  
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hat improvements in growth performance require a prior improvement in market-
romoting governance. But this conclusion is based on a statistical result that is 
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misleading as it pools countries and does not adequately adjust for initial conditions. 
he data is actually telling us that no developing country achieved advanced country 
gover  fact, 
converging and diverging developing count e 
ind e 
be d 
to  
identified there that are consistent with the case study and other empirical evidence.  
 
 
T
nance characteristics as measured by market-promoting governance. But in
ries do not differ in terms of thes
icators. The interesting governance differences are more likely to be ones that hav
en discussed in the literature on catching up and developmental states, and we nee
return to that literature to see if any significant governance differences have been
Box 5. Similarities and differences with Sachs’ analysis of governance 
 
Our results are entirely consistent with Sachs et al. (2004) who show that when 
initial incomes are taken into account, (market-enhancing) governance quality 
does not explain any significant part of growth differences within Africa. A 
similar conclusion is reached by Glaeser et al. (2004) in a wide ranging 
examination of market-enhancing governance indicators and economic 
performance. 
 
However, we do not conclude like Sachs and Glaeser that governance is 
therefore a red herring. Our argument is that governance does matter, but we are 
looking at the wrong kinds of governance. There are indeed no significant 
market-enhancing governance differences between group 1 and group 2 
countries in Figure 14, but there may be significant growth-enhancing 
governance differences that we should be looking for.  
 
Our analysis of the significance of good governance is supported by the analysis of 
growth in African countries by Sachs and his collaborators (Sachs, et al. 2004). In 
their study of African countries, they address the problem that countries with higher 
per capita incomes are expected to have better market-enhancing governance quality 
and so their better governance indicators should not be used to explain their higher 
incomes. They do this by not using market-enhancing governance indicators directly 
as explanatory variables, but instead using the deviation of the governance indicator 
(in this case the Kaufmann-World Bank index) from the predicted value of the 
dicator given the country’s per capita income at the beginning of the period. This in
approach is a more sophisticated way of dealing with the two-way causation between 
governance and growth. If market-enhancing governance matters for growth, we 
would expect countries that had better governance than would be expected for their 
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per capita incomes to do better in subsequent periods compared to countries that only 
achieved average or below average governance for their per capita incomes. By 
making this correction, the Sachs study finds that market-enhancing governance has 
no effect on the growth performance of African countries.  
 
Their conclusion is entirely consistent with our own. In both cases, we are reducing 
the likelihood of a false relationship between governance and growth being picked up 
ven 
e reasons discussed earlier. The powerful econometric results reported by Sachs et 
 irrelevant for growth, 
as a result of the reverse relationship between high per capita incomes and 
governance. In our case, we do this by separating out the advanced countries from the 
developing countries, and examining whether the converging and diverging 
developing countries display any significant differences in their market-promoting 
governance indicators. In both cases, the conclusion is that when initial per capita 
incomes are taken into account, the role of market-promoting governance in 
explaining growth is much smaller and probably negligible.  
 
However, we do not entirely agree with Sachs when they conclude that these results 
show that governance reforms are not an immediate priority for African countries. 
They argue that to trigger growth in Africa what is required instead is a big push in 
the form of a massive injection of investment in infrastructure and disease control. 
While the case for a big push in Africa is strong, this does not mean that African 
countries have the minimum necessary governance conditions to ensure that a viable 
economic and social transformation will be unleashed by such an investment push.  
 
This is because the evidence of big push experiments in many countries has 
demonstrated that growth is only sustainable if resources are used to enhance 
productive capacity and new producers are able to achieve rapid productivity growth. 
These outcomes are not likely in the absence of institutional support from and 
regulation by state structures possessing the appropriate governance capabilities gi
th
al. (2004) do not actually show that all types of governance are
only that the market-enhancing governance that is measured by available governance 
indicators clearly has less significance in explaining differences in performance 
between developing countries than is widely believed. Other forms of governance 
may be very important, as suggested in our figure 14, but indices measuring these 
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governance capacities are not readily available. In our next section we look at the 
evidence suggesting the importance of growth-enhancing governance capabilities. 
he first governance capability is required to manage the structurally weak property 
et competition that has been ignored in recent years, and that is the 
portance of tacit knowledge and learning in achieving international 
difficulty of managing political stabilization using transparent fiscal processes. This 
 
3. Growth-Enhancing Governance and Economic Growth. 
The good governance agenda ignores a number of critical structural challenges faced 
by developing countries going through the transformation from low productivity pre-
capitalist societies to higher productivity capitalist ones. We review four structural 
features of developing countries that require very different governance capabilities if 
developing countries are to make successful and sustainable transformations into 
higher productivity economies.  
 
T
rights that characterize developing countries. Theory and evidence suggests that 
contrary to good governance theory, the weakness of property rights in developing 
countries is structural and not due to the greed of political leaderships or their 
inadequate political will in enforcement. If stable property rights across the board 
cannot be achieved, the difference between more and less successful transformations 
is due to more subtle governance differences that allow productive capitalism to 
emerge in some cases but not others.  
 
Secondly, emerging capitalists in developing countries face a structural problem in 
competing with more advanced countries. These structural problems are to do with a 
feature of mark
im
competitiveness. Achieving these capabilities requires complementary governance 
capabilities on the part of the state to manage incentives and opportunities for 
technological catching up, while creating compulsions for capitalists not to waste 
resources. Countries differ widely in these capabilities, but without any such 
capability, growth is likely to be limited to relatively few sectors that have already 
achieved international competitiveness and therefore likely to be low or 
unsustainable. 
 
Thirdly, developing countries suffer from structural political corruption due to the 
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explains the widespread role of political corruption and patron-client politics in 
developing countries. The common analysis of neo-patrimonialism in developing 
ountries points to the need to modernize political systems. But this ignores the fact 
that m iable, 
resources that are just not  
suc s. 
Su n 
ma o 
co
 
c
odern political systems require significant fiscal resources to be v
available in any developing country. In fact, we know that
cessful developing countries have not been characterized by Weberian state
ccess in economic transformation has rather required governance capabilities i
naging patron-client politics in ways that have allowed capitalist accumulation t
ntinue rapidly. 
Box 6 The link between growth-enhancing governance and security 
 
The persistence of structural drivers that prevent good governance from getting 
entrenched means developing countries face an ongoing and persistent threat of 
predatory and extortionate behaviour on the part of public officials reaching a 
point where economic and political stability is threatened. A common feature of 
successful developing countries is that their states were cohesive and strong 
enough to prevent the unravelling of development strategies through predation 
and extortion. Preventing a slide into predation and anarchy is critical, but it 
cannot be achieved by focusing on security and enforcement alone. Success in 
improving the enforcement capacities of the state requires simultaneous 
improvements in the capacity of the state to lead economic development. This is 
because economic development is the most potent source of legitimacy for 
developing country states. Without legitimacy, security is unlikely to be 
sustained, regardless of direct expenditures on policing. We would argue that 
even in the most vulnerable states, it is never too early to start thinking about 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities. It is important to remember that 
significant improvements in growth-enhancing governance capabilities in South 
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and China took place in the context of deep internal 
crisis and the threat of internal and external insecurity.  
 
Attention to these growth-enhancing governance capabilities is not only required for 
achieving sustainable growth, but also for ensuring security and stability in 
developing countries. In the next sub-sections, we look at these issues in turn.  
 
Weak property rights and the prevalence of non-market asset transfers.  
A critical structural problem in many developing countries is that property rights are 
contested and weakly protected because of the limited public resources available for 
adequately defining and protecting property rights. In much of the conventional 
nalysis of governance and corruption in developing countries, it is implicitly a
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assum ugh 
governance reform
fac y 
co r 
pro d 
ach
 
ed that the protection of property rights can be dramatically improved thro
s and by reducing corruption. This analysis ignores the economic 
t that constructing a nation-wide system of stable property rights is an extremel
stly enterprise. Advanced countries only achieved significant stability in thei
perty rights at a relatively late stage of their development when most assets ha
ieved high levels of productivity (Khan 2002, 2004, 2006).  
Box 7 Why Acemoglu’s analysis of property right stability is misleading 
 
Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) article argued that countries that achieved stable 
property rights a century or more ago are still doing better. They use malaria 
deaths of white settlers in colonial times as an indicator of property right 
stability on the grounds that where malaria was limited white settlers did settle 
and established stable property rights, but where malaria was endemic they 
established extractive states with weak property rights, and these countries are 
still paying the price.  
 
Most commentators have focused on the elegance of their proxy indicator of 
property right stability or they have criticized it as misleading. But in fact there 
is a more serious criticism of their reading of history.  
 
Even if we accept that where white settlers settled property rights were 
eventually more stable, while the settlement was taking place, we know that 
there was violent and widespread non-market expropriation of pre-existing 
indigenous property rights. White settler colonies made the transition to 
capitalism faster, but while they were making the transition, property rights 
were very unstable for most people. A very similar transition to capitalism is 
taking place in other countries but at a much slower pace. They too suffer from 
unstable property rights and non-market transfers, but in most cases, the 
instability is actually less than in the settler colonies when their rapid transition 
to capitalism was taking place. 
 
There is considerable controversy within institutional economics about whether stable 
and well-defined property rights are a precondition for growth. In an influential paper 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that the achievement of stable property rights centuries 
ago enabled those countries to become prosperous while others who failed to achieve 
these conditions did not. This argument uses proxy indicators to measure the stability 
of property rights a century or more ago. Their now-famous indicator is the relative 
frequency of deaths of white settlers in different parts of Africa that determined 
whether Europeans set up settler colonies with stable property rights or extractive 
colonies where settlers did not come, but where property rights were destabilized by 
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colonial powers. This analysis is seductive in its use of innovative statistical 
techniques but suffers from serious historical problems. Most significantly, the 
ountries where settlers went did not enjoy stable property rights while the settlers 
capitalism became 
stablished in some countries, property rights become well protected. In settler 
 being 
stablished. But in fact, one of the significant conclusions of the New Institutional 
c
were taking over these societies. Indeed, they suffered from precipitous collapses of 
traditional property rights as large tracts of land were expropriated by the colonial 
settlers. In some cases the expropriation was so severe and rapid that indigenous 
populations collapsed entirely. To describe this as the establishment of stable property 
rights does violence to the historical facts.  
 
It is more accurate to say that the transformation of property rights to capitalist ones 
happened very rapidly, so that eventually capitalist economies emerged in these 
societies earlier than in others where the process of property right transformation is 
still going on. The rapid emergence of viable capitalist economies then allowed 
property rights to be protected and become stable in the way we would expect. In one 
sense, we could even argue that property rights were more stable in the non-settler 
countries because a precipitous historical rupture did not occur there. The problem for 
these countries is that similar property right transitions have to be organized today, 
with less violence and more justice. Of course, once a viable 
e
colonies this happened quite a long time ago, but the stability of property rights across 
the board in these societies did not predate the establishment of a productive 
capitalism. In other words, Acemoglu et al.’s argument suffers from exactly the type 
of causality problem as the good governance arguments we discussed earlier, despite 
their use of some sophisticated econometrics and proxy variables.  
 
The unlikelihood of establishing stable property rights in developing countries before 
the establishment of a productive capitalism is actually well supported by New 
Institutional Economics even though most researchers subscribing to this school have 
argued that modern economies emerged as a result of stable property rights
e
Economics introduced by Douglass North and others was to point out that the 
protection and exchange of property rights is an extremely costly business. These 
costs are part of the transaction costs of a market economy, and New Institutional 
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Economics pointed out that in advanced economies, transaction costs may account for 
as much as half of all economic activity (North and Wallis 1987; North 1990).  
 
An efficient economy has slightly lower transaction costs than others, but it never has 
zero transaction costs or anything approaching that. In addition, in an efficient market 
economy like the US, transaction costs may be low for individual transactors at the 
point of exchange (this is the definition of an efficient market) but collective 
transaction costs for the economy as a whole are not low at all. These collective 
transaction costs can be paid because almost all assets in an advanced country are 
very productive (by definition) and so owners can pay the taxes and incur the private 
expenditures on legal and security systems that ensure that at the point of exchange, 
transaction costs are low. In a developing country, most assets are of low productivity 
and cannot pay the cost of their own protection. It is not surprising that every 
developing country suffers from contested and weak property rights. 
 
Figure 15 sh
of the assets
definition th
how the pro
Resources Captured by 
Unproductive Groups: 
Economic Collapse
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 Figure 15 Drivers of property right instability in developing countrieows the drivers of this governance failure in graphical form. When most 
 in a country have not yet achieved high productivity uses (which is by 
e case in a developing or transition economy), it is difficult to imagine 
tection of property rights across the board can be paid for. Developing 
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countries have to live with a much higher degree of property right instability 
compared to advanced countries, but this is not entirely or even largely due to the 
greed and discretion of their public officials. When property rights are not secure to 
any satisfactory extent, and transaction costs at the point of exchange are high, 
inevitably many transactions will be too expensive to conduct through the market. 
his would be the case even with honest officials and transparent political processes, 
sts of market 
ansaction would be too high. For instance, when a road is to be constructed, the 
sue for policy is that the outcomes of these non-market asset transfers 
an result in a successful transition to a modern capitalist economy or to predation and 
T
but in fact officials and politicians are also likely to exploit opportunities provided by 
such a context. How they do this, and the capacities and incentives they have to 
govern this process determine the outcomes. Thus, while non-market transfers are 
ubiquitous and much more significant in developing compared to advanced countries, 
the outcomes of these processes can be radically different across countries, as figure 
15 summarizes.  
 
Non-market transfers include not just high profile cases of appropriation and theft 
using political power, but also cases of legal non-market transfers through land 
reform, state allocation of land for development, and the use of the right of eminent 
domain in allocating public resources. The right of eminent domain is regularly used 
to transfer assets in advanced countries when the transaction co
tr
transaction cost of purchasing many small plots of land and negotiating prices with 
individual owners would be too high. In these cases, the state uses its right of eminent 
domain to fix a price for the affected land through bureaucratic processes and then 
purchases the land using compulsory purchase orders. The only difference in 
developing countries is that range of asset transfers where transaction costs would be 
too high is even greater because of the weak rights that initially exist.  
 
Non-market asset transfers of different types can thus often be structurally necessary 
in developing countries but do open up the possibility of abuse and corruption. But 
they are not likely to be stopped by simply addressing the greed and discretion of 
public officials as there are deeper structural factors driving these processes. Rather, 
the critical is
c
loss of resources to overseas tax havens. The difference between these two outcomes 
is not that in one case there was good governance as defined in the good governance 
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analysis and in the other there was not. Rather, the difference is a more subtle set of 
institutional and political factors that create incentives and compulsions for public and 
private actors benefiting from non-market transfers to ensure investment in productive 
enterprises.  
 
The case study evidence strongly supports our analysis. Not surprisingly, a significant 
part of the asset and resource re-allocations necessary for accelerating development in 
developing countries have taken place through semi-market or entirely non-market 
processes. These processes have been very diverse. Examples include the English 
Enclosures from the 16th to the 18th century; the creation of the chaebol in South 
Korea in the 1960s using transfers of public resources to these privileged groups; the 
creation of the Chinese TVEs using public resources in the 1980s and their 
rivatization in the 1990s; and the allocation and appropriation of public land and 
his analysis should not give us cause for complacency about the importance of 
p
resources for development in Thailand. Successful developers have displayed a range 
of institutional and political capacities that enabled semi-market and non-market asset 
and property right re-allocations that were growth enhancing. In contrast, in less 
successful developers, the absence of necessary governance capabilities meant that 
non-market transfers descended more frequently into predatory expropriation that 
impeded development.  
 
T
governance. Rather it should direct our attention to a more critical set of governance 
reforms that are able to create stable expectations for critical sectors to enable 
accelerated investment and growth. In contrast, trying to implement reforms that 
attempt to achieve property right stability across the board in poor countries that lack 
the economic resources to make it feasible is likely only to result in frustration and 
eventually the abandonment of the reform programme. 
 
Research questions: The existing literature identifies many different types of non-
market asset transfers in developing countries that played a part in accelerating 
economic development. But there is little explicit analysis or identification of the 
governance capabilities that allowed the steering of non-market asset transfers in 
developing countries towards productive or unproductive outcomes. A proposed study 
could build on case studies of a number of countries, including South Korea, China, 
 41
Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, and others to identify the different governance 
characteristics that allowed or prevented growth. Are there general characteristics of 
ese capabilities? The significant differences between successful countries suggests 
untries 
arning to overcome low productivity in late developers (Khan 2000b). Growth in 
ut the wage 
dvantage. Unfortunately, there are relatively few sectors in developing countries 
th
that there are no general institutional characteristics that all successful co
possessed but rather that they used different institutional mechanisms to achieve some 
common outcomes (Rodrik 1999, 2002, 2003). We need to understand better why 
different institutional capabilities and incentives for non-market transfers have been 
effective in different contexts given differences in political organizations and 
structures.  
 
Catching up, technology acquisition and governance capabilities  
A significant reason why developing countries, even successful ones, persistently 
diverge from the efficient market model is that even reasonably efficient markets in 
developing countries face significant market failures when it comes to organizing 
le
developing countries requires catching up through the acquisition of new technologies 
and learning to use these new technologies rapidly. Markets, even the most efficient 
ones possible in a developing country, are typically inadequate on their own for 
attracting capital and new technologies in high value-added sectors. Efficient markets 
can only attract capital and technology to countries where these technologies are 
already profitable because the requisite skills of workers and managers already exist.  
 
In theory, free markets should lead to rapid convergence if capital could flow to 
developing countries to use their cheap labour. But this theory only works if labour 
productivity in developing countries is not so low that it wipes o
a
where this is true, and in some countries, there may be no sectors at all where capital 
would voluntarily wish to come. The problem is not only to do with infrastructure and 
governance, but more fundamental. Developing countries have lower technological 
capabilities and therefore lower labour productivity in most sectors compared to 
advanced countries, and this low productivity wipes out their wage advantage even 
without taking into account problems of infrastructure and governance. 
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The reasons for the lower productivity are not primarily the lower levels of education 
of workers in developing countries. The average level of education in most 
developing countries is low, but in absolute numbers, there is typically an excess 
pply of labour in all skill categories. (This also explains why there is labour 
migrat  lies 
elsewhere, in a range of i
an -
do r-
op n 
the
 
su
ion out of developing countries in all skill categories). The real problem
ssues that economists have explained in terms of the time 
d effort it takes to achieve labour discipline, tacit knowledge and learning-by
ing. The knowledge about how to operate a modern factory at optimum or nea
timum efficiency has to be learned by both managers and workers by operating i
 factory for a time, even if optimum efficiency cannot be immediately achieved.  
Box 8 Learning and catching up involves absorbing temporary losses 
 
The productivity gap due to tacit knowledge, learning and labour discipline is 
fundamental to catching up. Learning to use new technologies inevitably 
involves a period of risk and financial losses. The potential gain is the promise 
of significant profitability in the future, but only if there is rapid and disciplined 
learning. For private investors in developing countries, the uncertainty involved 
in investing in this type of learning is typically too high to be worth the risk 
given that alternative investment opportunities are less risky and immediately 
profitable. Rapid catching up therefore requires public or private rents and 
complementary support by states with the governance capabilities to ensure that 
rent management can be effectively enforced (Aoki, et al. 1997; Khan and Jomo 
2000).  
 
The economic evidence is that: 
i) the productivity gap between advanced and developing countries is typically larger 
than the wage gap and explains why capital does not flood into developing countries. 
This productivity gap is persistent even in ‘medium-technology’ fields like cotton 
spinning. For instance, US productivity per worker in simple cotton spinning using 
identical technology was 7.8 times higher than Indian workers in 1978. And even in 
1990 Indian textile workers were achieving 25% of US productivity in 1959 (Clark 
nd Wolcott 2002). These massive differences can help to explain why there was so a
little inward investment in India during its period of virtually free trade with Britain 
during the colonial period. In addition, during the colonial period there were virtually 
no tariffs or restrictions on capital inflow or profit repatriation. Reproducing these 
colonial free trade conditions in developing countries today is likely to produce 
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similar outcomes in the absence of growth-enhancing strategies to improve productive 
capacities in these countries.  
 
ii) the productivity gap is less marked in low technology and low value-added sectors 
compared to higher technology and higher value-added sectors. This explains why 
hen capital does come, or investment is organized within the developing country, it 
oductivity growth in stitching garments 
ompared to the potential productivity growth in making fabrics. This is not 
nologies can be jumped. 
w
is almost always in lower technology and lower value-added activities. This is a more 
convincing explanation of the specialization of developing countries in low 
technology sectors than one that focuses on the relative prices of different factors. 
(Relative factor prices cannot explain why firms do not relocate capital equipment 
that they already own to cheaper wage locations. They do this sometimes, but only 
when the productivity differential justifies it. In theory capital inflows should be much 
greater and should not be concentrated in a few developing countries). 
 
iii) Productivity growth in low productivity sectors is in general slower than in higher 
productivity sectors. Imagine the potential pr
c
necessarily true for every sector that starts from a low technology base, but there are 
theoretical reasons why we would expect it to be true. Technologies that are already 
very high productivity are by definition technologies that have a lot of embedded 
technology in them, and these are technologies where incremental technological 
progress is most likely. This explains why countries can get trapped into low 
technology sectors from which there is no automatic escape till the productivity gap to 
the higher level tech
 
iv) Overcoming the productivity gap is not just a question of setting up infant 
industries and letting them run, but also of setting up institutional compulsions that 
ensure that the effort involved in learning is forthcoming (Khan 2005a). This explains 
why catching-up strategies failed in almost every country except a few. The few that 
were different had institutions that could exert the requisite compulsions on learning 
sectors so that learning did happen and these countries moved rapidly up the 
technology ladder. 
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Taken together, these observations can explain why even with complete trade 
openness and protection of expatriate property rights, colonies like India did not do 
o well in terms of industrialization or poverty reduction in the 19th and early 20th 
ce of confidence in liberalization and 
arket openness as strategies that will ensure moving up the technology ladder and 
), direct subsidies (in particular in South Korea), subsidized and 
rioritized infrastructure for priority sectors (in China and Malaysia), and subsidizing 
the licensing of advanced foreign technologies (in Taiwan). With the advent of a new 
consensus on international trade through the WTO, tariff protection is no longer an 
option for most developing countries, but historical experience tells us that this is not 
the only way, or even the most effective way in which to organize support for learning 
sectors. The common feature of successful learning strategies was the ability to create 
compulsions for successful learning because states had the institutional and political 
capacity to ensure that non-performance was not tolerated for too long (Amsden 1989; 
Khan 2000a).  
 
to
centuries. Indeed, even in terms of property rights and general governance, India 
under colonial rule would score reasonably highly. Not only did India not catch up 
with Britain and other advanced countries during this century and a half, it fell 
precipitately behind. From 1873 to 1947 Indian per capita income declined from 
around 25% of US per capita income to under 10 per cent. This experience has been 
almost entirely forgotten with the resurgen
m
reducing poverty in poor countries.  
 
A learning based theory of industrialization can explain why most developing 
countries specialize in low technology sectors. But it also suggests why this 
specialization in inferior technologies would not change rapidly if markets became 
somewhat more efficient. However, if developing countries could accelerate learning, 
and productivity growth in mid-technology sectors, this would result in an 
acceleration of the pace of development.  
 
The empirical evidence that is available from relatively successful developing 
countries suggests that the opportunities and compulsions for learning can be created 
by very different types of institutions and policies. Opportunities were created using 
many different mechanisms including tariff protection (in virtually every case but to 
varying extents
p
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The mechanisms through which this was achieved were very different in different 
countries, but the common feature of success was that failure led to corrective action 
that was effective. For instance, in South Korea, not only could subsidies be 
withdrawn, but failing enterprises were rapidly transferred to new ownership. In 
Malaysia, managements of public enterprises could be changed rapidly and private 
investors faced declining benefits over time. These compulsions were in turn credible 
because investors knew they could not protect themselves by buying factional 
political support. The mechanisms that ensured compulsions for learning in successful 
countries are, however, not well enough understood or studied, and this points to the 
need for careful research in these areas.  
 
Rent seeking/corruption appears as 
“benign” profit-sharing with public 
officials (South Korea, China)
Productivity gap 
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a “malign” process that protects 
the inefficient and the socially 
powerful
Failed Implementation/Permanent 
Rent Capture by “Infant” 
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 igure 16 Governance failures in catching up strategieses the focus of enquiry in identifying critical governance failures 
ries. If catching up involves creating opportunities for specific 
on is that catching up involves some sectors capturing temporary 
suggests that this is indeed the case. But then we should also 
tial rent seeking in these sectors, regardless of outcomes. Figure 
result. The real difference in governance between the successful 
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and less successful countries is not the presence of rent seeking and corruption in 
some cases and its absence in others (both the left and right hand forks in figure 16 
are associated with some rent seeking and corruption). The real difference is rather in 
the governance capabilities that allow effective management of rents and the capacity 
to withdraw rents such that opportunities and compulsions for technological progress 
are created. The identification of these capabilities is critical to see how they can be 
replicated in different political and institutional contexts.  
 
If the requisite governance capacities for effective rent management are missing, a 
growth-enhancing strategy may deliver worse outcomes than a market-led strategy, as 
poorly implemented interventions may worsen resource allocation as well as inducing 
high rent-seeking costs. But even a failed growth strategy can sometimes have 
unintended consequences that are potentially useful if it develops human capital even 
though it fails to profitably employ these resources. If human resources are developed, 
these can often be exploited in new ways even if the growth strategy fails. The 
interactive relationship between growth strategies, governance capabilities and 
technological capabilities of producers can help to explain  
 
a) why many different strategies of industrial catching up were successful in East 
Asia,  
b) why at the same time apparently similar growth-enhancing strategies have worked 
in some countries and failed dismally in others,  
c) why some countries like India have done reasonably well with liberalization by 
using some of the capacities developed by previous growth strategies in new ways 
and  
d) why other countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America have fared rather 
less well in terms of growth after liberalization when they allowed markets to 
significantly guide resource allocation to areas of current comparative advantage. In 
Latin America liberalization has often resulted in a shift towards lower technology 
manufacturing and commodity production.  
 
The success of liberalization in a number of countries, including India and Chile in 
the 1980s can also be explained rather better from this perspective. Growth in these 
newly liberalizing countries occurred in three types of sectors. First, there was growth 
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in a small number of sectors that had already acquired international competitiveness 
like parts of India’s machine tools or pharmaceutical sectors. These sectors had been 
beneficiaries of previous technology acquisition strategies, and benefited from the 
physical and human capital accumulation that had taken place earlier. Secondly, there 
was growth in low value-added sectors that benefited from the capital accumulation 
and entrepreneurial skills that had been accumulated in the previous period. Examples 
of these sectors include ready-made garments and grey cloths. They also include 
relatively low value-added sectors like call centres that benefited from human capital 
that had been created for high value uses (such as engineers). And finally, 
liberalization allowed some countries to grow by exporting commodities or natural 
resources. Success in these sectors was dramatic in some cases because they benefited 
from the growth in demand for commodities in the US and China. 
 
Box 9 Liberalization can unleash unused technological capabilities but how 
sustainable is this growth? 
If countries lack governance capabilities to sustain productivity growth in 
technology acquisition strategies, these strategies can achieve rapid 
accumulation for a while but with low productivity growth. Eventually the 
strategy becomes unsustainable. The experience of the Indian subcontinent is 
instructive. Liberalization can allow the technological capabilities that have 
been built up to be re-allocated to new uses to meet global demands and can 
lead to a growth spurt. Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani growth in the 1980s 
had these characteristics.  
 
But there are areas of concern about the sustainability of the new growth model.  
 
In India, we know that productivity growth in the manufacturing sector 
throughout the eighties was not driven by efficiency improvements in existing 
manufacturing capabilities, but rather by closing down subsidized sectors and 
developing new sectors that used human and physical capital in new value 
chains where India typically fitted in at a lower point in the global chain (Neogi 
and Ghosh 1998; Das 2004).  
 
For Indian manufacturing as a whole, productivity growth was moderate to low 
throughout the 1980s, suggesting that growth was not driven by the 
development of high-technology sectors (Srivastava 2000; Goldar 2004).  
 
Learning in the new model is not driven by the management of rents for 
learning, but by foreign technology transfers organized by the private sector 
through foreign linkups. The critical observation here is that even with foreign 
linkups, productivity growth only happened in the small number of sectors 
where the Indian partner was already fairly technologically advanced 
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(Siddhartan and Lal 2004). In contrast, in China, the state can step in to provide 
incentives and infrastructure on terms that can be used to attract medium-
technology manufacturing sectors that allows China to keep expanding its 
manufacturing learning-by-doing.  
 
These observations are entirely consistent with our argument that the unfettered 
market works for technology transfers where the developing country partner is 
already advanced, but does not work for developing country partners where 
significant learning has to be organized to compensate for large initial 
productivity differentials. These observations should warn us not to be too 
sanguine about the rate of spread of high value jobs even in relatively advanced 
developing countries like India that are now following market-driven 
technology acquisition strategies. Countries lower down the technology scale 
like Bangladesh or Uganda are much more vulnerable.  
 
 
The liberalization in the Indian subcontinental countries has to be distinguished from 
China, which emerged as the fastest growing economy in recorded history in a context 
of gradual and measured liberalization. To a far greater extent than other countries, 
including India, China combined growth-enhancing strategies with market-promoting 
strategies to move into mid-technology manufacturing. Many aspects of the 
successful growth-enhancing strategies of the past continue to be effectively 
implemented and appropriate growth-enhancing governance capabilities exist to 
implement them effectively. These strategies include the strategies of local and central 
government in China to make land and infrastructure available on a priority basis to 
investors in critical sectors, and to offer fiscal incentives and attractive terms to both 
foreign and overseas Chinese investors engaging in investments critical for economic 
progress (Qian and Weingast 1997).  
 
These ‘subsidized’ inputs allow Chinese firms to set up in global production before 
they have necessarily achieved global competitiveness if all their inputs had to be 
purchased in the market. Indeed, Indian manufactures complain bitterly at the way in 
which Chinese manufacturing can enter markets at below cost of production to 
establish economies of scale and learning advantages. Thus, while compared to the 
earlier generation of East Asian developers, the Chinese state appears to be doing less 
in terms of actively supporting technology upgrading, it still has very strong 
governance capacities to ensure the allocation of land, resources and infrastructure to 
critical investors and to ensure that unproductive firms are not able to retain support. 
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With its vast internal market and the broad-based technological capabilities it has 
already achieved, Chinese manufacturing has been able to acquire scale economies 
that enable it to compete in price almost without challenge in the low to mid-
technology manufacturing industries.  
 
In contrast, the countries of the Indian subcontinent have had a different experience 
with liberalization. Here, previous growth-enhancing strategies had succeeded in 
creating technological capabilities that were less broad-based than in China. Political 
fragmentation was much greater and the governance capabilities of states to direct 
resources to investors were significantly lower than in China. As in China, 
liberalization proceeded at a very slow pace, opening up opportunities without 
precipitately destroying too much of existing capacity by exposing inefficient 
industries to excessive competition in the local market. Growth has been led by 
sectors that had already achieved the minimum technological capability for 
international competition taking the opportunity to start producing aggressively for 
domestic and international markets. The results were higher growth rates than in the 
past, led by a small number of sectors that had acquired enough technological 
capability to enjoy comparative advantage in international markets. These sectors 
differed across South Asia, ranging from the garment industry and shrimps in 
Bangladesh, low-end textiles in Pakistan to diamond polishing, call centres and 
software in India. The growth of internal demand has also sparked off investment in a 
range of industries that still have not acquired international competitiveness. But 
South Asia lacks growth-enhancing strategies and capabilities on the part of 
government, with the result that ongoing technology acquisition is much more 
narrowly focused, and driven by firms that are already quite advanced engaging in 
partnerships with foreign firms. This process has resulted in limited learning in new 
sectors in India compared to China, and much less in less advanced developing 
countries like Bangladesh and Uganda.  
 
Our analysis suggests that while it is desirable over time to improve market-enhancing 
governance, the comparison of liberalization in China and India suggests that market-
enhancing governance cannot explain their relative performance. Case studies of 
China and India do not suggest that China performs much better than India (if at all) 
along critical dimensions of market-enhancing governance such as the stability of 
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property rights, corruption or the rule of law. Where it does do better is in having 
governance capacities for accelerating resource allocation to growth sectors, 
prioritizing infrastructure for these sectors, and in making credible and attractive 
terms available to investors bringing in advanced technologies, capabilities that we 
have described as growth-enhancing governance capabilities.  
 
Latin America provides even more compelling evidence that a focus on market-
enhancing governance alone cannot provide adequate policy levers for governments 
interested in accelerating growth and development. Compared to China and the Indian 
subcontinent, liberalization in Latin America has been more thoroughgoing and has 
extended in many cases to the liberalization of the capital account and much freer 
entry conditions for imports into the domestic market. In terms of market-enhancing 
governance, Latin America on average scores highly compared to other areas of the 
developing world. This is not surprising given higher per capita incomes, a much 
longer history of development, and relatively old institutions of political democracy 
(even though in many cases these institutions were for a while subverted by military 
governments).  
 
Yet its more developed market-enhancing governance capabilities and deeper 
liberalization did not help Latin America beat Asia in terms of economic development 
in the 1990s and beyond. In fact, relative performance was exactly the opposite of 
what we would expect from the relative depth of its liberalization strategy and its 
relative governance indicators. This should not be entirely surprising given our 
analysis. Latin American countries shifted even more rapidly to producing according 
to their comparative advantage, and in most Latin American countries this meant a 
shift to lower technology industries and to commodity production. This has produced 
respectable output growth in some countries, but productivity growth has been low. 
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Latin America 
1950s to 1970s
Indian 
subcontinent 
1980s 1990s
Supportive or Obstructive 
Governance Capabilities
Critical Components of 
Technology Acquisition Strategy
Economic 
Outcomes
Moderate to weak governance 
capacities to discipline non-
performing rent recipients. Agencies 
often have contradictory goals 
defined by different constituencies.
Fragmented political factions help to 
protect the rents of the inefficient for 
a share of these rents.
State capacities decline as committed 
public officials leave.
Targeted subsidies to accelerate 
catching up in critical sectors 
(using protection, licensing of 
foreign exchange, price controls 
and other mechanisms).
Public sector technology 
acquisition in subsidized public 
enterprises.
Resource transfers to growth 
sectors using licensing and pricing 
policy.
Public and private 
sector infant 
industries often fail 
to grow up.
Rent seeking costs 
are often the most 
visible effects of 
intervention.
Moderate to low 
growth and slow 
transformation
Indian 
subcontinent 
1960s 1970s
(With some 
variations these 
characteristics 
describe many 
developing 
countries of that 
period)
Malaysia 
1980s 1990s
Moderately effective centralized 
governance.
Assisted by centralized transfers to 
intermediate classes which reduced 
incentives of political factions to seek 
rents by protecting inefficient firms. 
Public sector technology 
acquisition by public enterprises 
with diffusion to private sector 
firms through subcontracting.
 Targeted infrastructure and other 
incentives for MNCs with 
conditions for technology transfer. 
Rapid growth and 
capitalist 
transformation
Latin America 
1980s onwards
Breakdown of corporatist alliances 
allows liberalization to be 
implemented (to varying extents in 
different countries).
Rapid liberalization across the 
board.
Output growth in 
sectors that already 
have comparative 
advantage, in 
particular in 
commodities.
Non-market asset allocations to 
growth drivers (consolidations, 
mergers and restructuring of 
).
Targeted conditional subsidies for 
 to accelerate catching-up.
chaebol
chaebol
Very rapid growth 
and capitalist 
transformation
South Korea
1960s to early 
1980s
Centralized governance by agencies 
with long-term stake in 
development.
Effective implementation assisted by 
weakness of political factions so that 
inefficient subsidy recipients are 
unable to buy protection from them.
Liberalization primarily in the form 
of a withdrawal of implicit targeted 
subsidies, in particular through the 
relaxation of licensing for capital 
goods imports.
Much more gradual withdrawal of 
protection across the board for 
domestic markets.
Moderate to weak governance 
capacities to implement remain but 
do less damage as the scope of 
growth enhancing policies decline.
Fragmented political factions 
continue to have an effect on market-
enhancing governance by restricting 
tax revenues and making it difficult 
to construct adequate infrastructure.
Growth led by 
investments in 
sectors that already 
have comparative 
advantage.
Higher growth but 
limited to a few 
sectors.
Domestic capacity building 
through selective tariffs and 
selective credit allocation.
Governance effective in directing 
resources to import-substituting 
industries but weak in disciplining 
poor performers. 
Weakness linked to “corporatist” 
alliances that constrained 
disciplining powerful sectors.
Initial rapid growth 
slows down. 
Many infant 
industries fail to 
grow up.
Table 10 Technology acquisition strategies and experiences 
Table 10 summarizes a selected range of historical observations to highlight some of 
the key characteristics of successful and less successful technology acquisition 
strategies and the implications for growth. The technology acquisition strategies of the 
sixties and seventies across the developing world produced dramatic success but only 
in countries that by good fortune happened to have the institutional and political 
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conditions that allowed them to create both opportunities and compulsions for rapid 
learning. In other developing countries, similar strategies allowed high levels of 
accumulation and more rapid growth than the ones achieved under imperial rule when 
free markets dominated. But they did not achieve the productivity growth that would 
have allowed their emerging industries to become truly viable in their ability to face 
international competition over time. The eventual fiscal crisis that some of the less 
successful countries faced as a result of the failure to discipline non-performing 
industries led to strategies of liberalization being adopted in many of these countries. 
And finally, liberalization in some countries that had achieved some success with 
technology acquisition allowed growth spurts to begin in the 1980s in the Indian 
subcontinent and parts of Latin America. 
 
This complex picture suggests that in figure 14, the group of converging countries 
shown as group 2 includes countries of several different types and not all of them may 
be enjoying sustainable growth. Some are countries that have sustainable technology 
acquisition strategies and are therefore on sustainable growth paths based on 
continuous productivity growth and the maintenance of competitiveness and 
improvements in living standards. But group 2 countries could in the past also have 
included countries attempting technology acquisition without adequate governance 
capabilities to make this truly sustainable. For instance, Pakistan in the early 1960s 
was a converging country, but this growth spurt was unsustainable because its 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities were not appropriate for ensuring the 
successful implementation of its technology acquisition strategy. And today, group 2 
includes a number of countries that have abandoned technology acquisition strategies 
in the formal sense, but which are growing rapidly because they have already acquired 
physical and human capital in some niche sectors that give them international 
competitiveness.  
 
By integrating into global markets and production chains using these competitive 
sectors, some of the latter group of countries have achieved significant growth rates 
and joined the converging group in the 1980s and 1990s. The question is whether 
countries like Bangladesh or Uganda that have enjoyed convergence growth rates in 
the 1990s have discovered a new growth strategy that dispenses with a technology 
acquisition strategy, or are these spurts going to prove short-lived, as much of the 
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historical evidence on purely market-driven growth would suggest. If we assume that 
some countries in group 2 are on sustainable convergence paths while others are not, 
we need to identify the governance conditions that differentiate them. Clearly good 
governance does not help us very much in this respect, because as we have already 
discussed, the countries in group 2 have the same mean and dispersion as group 1. 
Our hunch is that the sustainable sub-group within group 2 are the countries that have 
a sustainable technology acquisition strategy based on effective governance 
capabilities to police the particular strategy they are following. This is a critical 
research and policy question that needs to be examined using all the available 
evidence.  
 
Of course, it would be simplistic to suggest that within group 2 there are countries that 
do have the governance capabilities to follow a technology acquisition strategy, and 
others who have no capability to implement technology acquisition strategies. Even 
countries that are following largely market-driven growth strategies have elements of 
formal or informal strategies to promote technology acquisition and discipline these 
processes. This is particularly the case in countries like India where government-
business relationships are quite well-developed in pockets. But there are elements of 
informal government-business relationships in countries like Bangladesh that also 
assist some sectors to acquire technology by gaining temporary advantages that allow 
them to start producing without achieving international competitiveness. It is also 
important for policy to identify these processes and examine if policy can assist in 
deepening these trends. 
 
The real challenge for policy is to address the diverse ways in which technology 
acquisition has been organized in different countries. Case-study evidence suggests 
that success in growth-enhancing governance depends critically on success in 
enforcement. This in turn depends on a number of institutional and political factors 
that enable the effective implementation of the underlying growth-enhancing 
strategies. The institutional requirements include the requirement that the agencies 
involved in monitoring and enforcement are sufficiently centralized to be able to 
internalize all the costs and benefits of implementing the strategy (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1993; Khan 2000a). This is to ensure that failing industries or sectors are not 
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able to offer inducements to monitoring agencies to allow them to continue to receive 
their rents or occupy their assets without delivering performance.  
 
Just as important if not more is the political requirement that the governance agencies 
are able to enforce difficult decisions about rent and resource withdrawal from non-
performing sectors and firms when required. This in turn requires a compatibility of 
the required governance tasks with the internal power structures of the country. Table 
10 also summarizes how the internal power structures of these countries played an 
important role in explaining why particular strategies of governance could or could 
not be effectively implemented.  
 
For instance, growth-enhancing governance of technology acquisition strategies is 
helped if political factions are too weak to protect non-performing industries and 
sectors. If political factions are strong and there are many of them, it becomes 
relatively easy for failing firms to buy themselves protection by offering to share a 
part of their rents with factions that offer to protect them. The South Korean 
experience with industrial policy during the 1960s and 1970s demonstrates how the 
absence of strong political factions can have very beneficial effects for a particular 
strategy of growth-enhancing governance. In contrast, the South Asian experience 
during the same decades (like that of many other parts of the developing world) shows 
how fragmented political factions can prevent effective growth-enhancing 
governance. But growth-enhancing governance can be moderately effective even in 
the presence of strong political factions, provided there is a political settlement that 
allows the political demands of factions to be satisfied through centralized transfers. 
This can reduce the incentive of factions to capture rents by protecting rent-recipients 
who are willing to pay. The Malaysian growth strategy of the 1980s and 1990s 
provides strong support for this hypothesis.  
 
These possibilities can explain why successful countries appear to have very different 
growth-enhancing strategies when we look at the details of the instruments and 
mechanisms through which they set out to achieve rapid development. Strategies that 
can be effectively implemented in one context may be much more difficult to 
implement somewhere else. Very different policy instruments may be more effective 
in other contexts if governance capabilities are more appropriate for enforcing 
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alternative strategies. This can explain why we can observe different successful 
combinations of policies and growth-enhancing governance capabilities. So, for 
instance, a strategy of subsidizing credit for large conglomerates as in South Korea 
may have provided poorer results in a country like Malaysia where the enforcement 
capacities for such a strategy may have been much weaker. In contrast, the Malaysian 
strategy of creating incentives for multinational companies to bring in high 
technology industries and subcontract to local companies proved much more 
successful because this strategy was more consistent with Malaysian governance 
capabilities. Thus, while Malaysian economic performance was a little poorer than 
that of South Korea, given Malaysia’s internal institutional and political structure and 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities, Malaysia’s growth was probably higher 
than if Malaysia had tried to follow South Korean economic strategies precisely.  
 
An analysis of the types of growth-enhancing strategies that can be effectively 
implemented in particular developing countries could therefore identify somewhat 
different growth strategies in different countries, even though they address similar 
problems (of accelerating resource allocation to growth sectors and accelerating 
technology acquisition). The importance of such an analysis is not only to identify the 
growth strategies appropriate for the country given its growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities. In many countries, growth-enhancing governance capabilities may be so 
poor that no growth strategy can be implemented. In these cases, the policy response 
should not necessarily be to abandon growth strategies and shift to market-enhancing 
strategies. It should rather be to examine the type of growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities that can feasibly be achieved in that country through a process of 
reforming the organization of power itself. We will discuss this further in our 
discussion of political stabilization and patron-client networks.   
 
Although much of the technology acquisition strategies in Asia have centred on 
industry and manufacturing, there is no reason why technology acquisition should not 
be a strategy that is relevant for agriculture or services. The role of agriculture is 
likely to be more significant in some countries, particularly in Africa. However, Sachs 
et al.’s observation (Sachs, et al. 2004) that Africa’s environment and geography 
make it unlikely that agriculture can transform most African countries into high 
income ones needs to be kept in mind. Agriculture in Africa does have to be promoted 
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to prevent humanitarian disasters, but in many African countries it would be far too 
expensive to make agriculture a high value-added sector that can sustain moderate to 
high living standards. Agriculture, like industry, can only sustain moderate to high 
living standards if it is highly capitalized and mechanized, and serviced by effective 
infrastructure. The latter is particularly difficult in Africa, as is the likelihood of 
developing HYV seeds for many of the types of crops that grow in its relatively harsh 
environment. The Asian experience is therefore relevant for Africa in pointing out the 
difficulty of achieving sustained improvements in living standards mainly by focusing 
on agriculture. But Asia also shows that without agriculture being able to sustain most 
people in at least steadily improving conditions, it is very difficult to prevent 
worsening poverty. 
 
Technology acquisition strategies become relevant for agriculture once we have high 
value-added agricultural sectors that are vying for international markets or competing 
with high value imports. Just as in industry, moving up the technology ladder by using 
mechanization, better seeds and techniques also involves learning-by-doing and the 
financial space to achieve this learning. Exactly the same questions then arise, and the 
Asian experience shows the importance of agricultural extension services that carried 
out the task of spreading new technologies and techniques using public funding. 
However, with very poor peasants, the issues and constraints are different from 
industrial learning. Poor peasants do not need compulsion and discipline to put in 
effort in learning new technologies, rather the problem is that they are too risk averse 
even with subsidized inputs to adopt them because mistakes can cost them their lives. 
Therefore the issue with very poor peasants, as opposed to emerging capitalist 
farming, is how to overcome risk aversion and extreme financial constraints. The 
problems we have discussed of disciplining catching up strategies are more relevant 
for capitalist farms that do have a chance of surviving in international competition but 
are constrained by productivity. As Sachs et al. (2004) and others have pointed out, 
most African farms are even potentially not in this league, and while poor farmers 
should not be neglected, the long term issues of catching up and achieving sustainable 
high incomes will have to be largely based on industry and services in most African 
countries. 
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Research questions: The first critical research question is to distinguish between 
different converging developing countries. Some rapid growers are following 
sustainable technology acquisition strategies, others are growing based on market-
driven growth. It is noteworthy that most countries in the latter group (such as Uganda 
or Bangladesh) would not score highly on either market-enhancing or growth-
enhancing governance capabilities. There are structural barriers to improving market-
enhancing governance capabilities in these countries, and doubts about whether such 
capabilities would be sufficient to put these countries on sustainable growth paths 
involving rapid technology acquisition. We need a better understanding of the 
sustainability of growth in these countries to identify problems as early as possible.  
 
A second critical research question is to identify and classify different rent 
management strategies in countries with successful technology acquisition strategies, 
and the associated political and institutional capabilities that allowed or prevented 
their implementation. This classification may help to design viable governance 
reforms that aim to develop governance capabilities for faster technology acquisition 
in other contexts.  
 
The distinctive feature of the proposed research compared to existing research 
findings will be to explicitly look for the interface between institutional capabilities 
for rent management and the political conditions that allow or prevent the effective 
implementation of these strategies. The assumption behind this research is that 
catching up strategies that worked in one context will not necessarily work in another 
if the underlying political conditions are different. Moreover, while some of the most 
successful countries (like South Korea) had formal institutional mechanisms for 
supporting technology acquisition, in other countries technology acquisition may be 
supported informally through specific government-business relationships that are not 
or cannot be formalized. Nevertheless, here too there is a need to distinguish between 
informal government-business relationships that create the right opportunities and 
compulsions for rapid technology acquisition (as in contemporary China) compared to 
other cases where the results are more in the nature of rent capture by inefficient 
capitalists. The outcome of the research will be to further our understanding of these 
interfaces, to identify and suggest the types of institutional and policy reform 
strategies that may be viable in particular contexts.  
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 Governance and the management of political stability  
One of the main reasons why developing countries as a group diverge so significantly 
from the good governance conditions is that their political systems do not operate 
with formal and transparent rules for public officials that ensure the accountability of 
political officials to elected bodies in the way that advanced countries do. There is a 
large and growing gap between the reality of developing country politics and the 
policy prescriptions coming from good governance theory. Once again, the question is 
why this is so systematic. 
 
Personalized 
Political 
Power
Clientelism and 
Patron-Client 
Politics
 Politically 
Driven 
Accumulation
Economic 
and Political 
Under-
Development
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization
Description of Rent-Seeking in 
Developing Countries
Informal rather 
than Formal 
Institutions
Widespread 
Corruption
Creation of 
Rents
Absence of 
Democracy and 
Accountability
Economic 
inequality and 
dependence
s 
A pow
come
devel
forma
2002)
demo
perso
persis
institu
and h
econo
this a
 Figure 17 The neo-patrimonial analysis of the causes and effects of patron-client politicerful set of analyses of the political economy problems of developing countries 
s from the neo-patrimonial school that sets up a contrast between typical 
oping country political structures with the Weberian ideal of a rational and 
l state based on impersonal political relationships (Eisenstadt 1973; Médard 
. The core argument of this emerging analysis was that the absence of 
cracy and accountability in developing countries allowed political bosses to use 
nalized power to run patron-client networks with their clients. This explained the 
tence of patron-client politics, the importance of informal rather than formal 
tions, and the widespread corruption that could then be engaged in by the patron 
is clients. The result was politically driven accumulation that produced the 
mic and political underdevelopment of developing countries. The main links in 
rgument are shown in figure 17. The early theory has been added to by 
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subsequent analysis that has focused on the contribution of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and economic inequalities in perpetuating personalized politics and 
its damaging effects (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Blair 2005; Barbone, et al. 2006).   
 
The policy conclusion of these approaches is that democratization and other strategies 
to weaken personalized politics will weaken the hold of patron-client politics and 
move these economies towards modern polities. However, there is a growing 
recognition that in the presence of severe ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 
democratization may not work in weakening patron-client politics, and may even 
strengthen these tendencies (Barbone, et al. 2006). Moreover, as Barbone et al. point 
out, sometimes patron-client politics appears to operate even in the absence of 
fractionalization (as in Tunisia or Bangladesh). However, the expectation is that 
patron-client politics is avoidable in developing countries, that there are specific 
institutional failures that enable its continuation, and that the desirable and achievable 
state of affairs is a democracy that is accountable, with political institutions that work 
on principles of impersonal politics (AFD, et al. 2005). Such a political system is an 
integral part of the good governance framework described in figure 5. 
 
The problem is that no examples exist of such a state of politics in the developing 
world. Even in India, the world’s most attractive model of a working and sustainable 
democracy in a developing country, we know that the Indian political system is riven 
with corruption, that patron-client politics rules, and that political reform when it 
happens, takes place because reformers can work the patron-client system, not 
because they have overcome its limitations by progressing towards a modern 
Weberian political system (Jenkins 2000; Harriss-White 2003; Khan 2005b). 
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Figure 18 Structural drivers of patron-client politics 
 
An alternative explanation for the persistence of patron-client politics is developed in 
(Khan 2005b). The alternative argument is that there are significant structural factors 
that make patron-client politics a rational response to the problem of maintaining 
political stability in a developing country. The main drivers of this type of politics are 
shown in figure 18. The critical constraint is that all developing countries suffer from 
limited fiscal resources because (apart from the political failures to collect tax) by 
definition the development of their formal taxable sectors is limited. At the same time, 
managing political stability is even more demanding than in an advanced country 
because of the deep social dislocations caused by the economic and social 
transformations of development. The option of managing social stability through 
transparent and legal transfers through the fiscal system simply does not add up. This 
does not mean that tax collection cannot be increased and that this would not help the 
situation. But in most developing countries, feasible increases in tax collection would 
not solve the fundamental problem that the tax take would still be insufficient to pay 
for all necessary services and still be able to pay for the necessary political 
stabilization of society through transparent fiscal transfers.  
 
The recourse to patron-client politics as a universal response in all developing 
countries regardless of culture, politics or economic strategies can be better explained 
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by this fundamental structural driver. Patron-client politics makes sense because it 
allows the governing group to identify the most critical, the best organized, the most 
troublesome, or simply the most dangerous constituencies and buy them off 
selectively. By definition, such a selective strategy of buying off specific 
constituencies cannot be done in a transparent way, and in any case the fiscal 
resources for satisfying even limited constituencies often do not exist in the budget. 
The most important politics in developing countries therefore often takes place off-
budget, with off-budget resources being raised for redistribution down patron-client 
networks.  
 
The difference between sustainable growth paths and unsustainable ones is not that in 
the first there were Weberian states behaving in impersonal and formal ways while 
the second suffered from patron-client politics. The history of developmental 
transitions is that both types of countries suffer from patron-client politics, but in the 
first, governance capabilities allow the maintenance of enough political stability for 
the muddling through of social transformation to take place (as in contemporary 
India), while in other countries, political stability cannot be maintained and a more or 
less rapid descent into political fragmentation takes place. The governance challenge 
is to understand how in specific contexts, the management of political stability is 
being achieved using the historical endowments of institutions and power structures, 
and whether feasible changes in political institutions and political organizations can 
assist in strengthening political stabilization. Here too, the governance priorities of 
market-enhancing governance may be misplaced. What we need is a much better 
understanding of the types of patron-client networks through which political 
stabilization and political accumulation take place in different countries, so that 
governance interventions can be designed to improve sustainable growth and 
development outcomes.  
 
The institutional capabilities that are appropriate for developing countries depend on 
the pre-existing disposition of organizational power that we have described as the 
political settlement (Khan 1995). We find that theories that have sought to explain 
success and failure in political management in Asia only in terms of the institutional 
capacities and leadership qualities of Asian states are seriously lacking in explanatory 
power (Khan 1995, 2000a). As with the other processes that we have discussed, 
 62
success in managing political stabilization has depended on the compatibility of 
institutional structures with pre-existing political structures of political organization 
and patron-client structures that describe the political settlement. For instance, 
attempts at authoritarian limitation of patron-client demands worked in South Korea 
in the sixties but failed in contemporary Pakistan because the organization of patron-
client networks in Pakistan in the sixties was much stronger and more fragmented, 
requiring a degree of repression for this strategy that was ultimately not feasible.  
 
In turn, the feasible strategy of political stabilization that was consistent with the 
political settlement that prevailed at the time in Pakistan limited the possibility of 
success of the particular technology acquisition strategies and asset transfer strategies 
that Pakistan was attempting at the time (Khan 1999). It is often forgotten that the 
South Korean technology acquisition strategy of providing conditional rents to 
learning industries was in fact innovated in Pakistan in the 1960s, but proved 
impossible to effectively implement in Pakistan because the fragmented clientelism in 
that country allowed individual capitalists to buy themselves protection at a relatively 
low price. The absence of fragmented clientelism in South Korea, allowed the 
effective implementation of the same strategy that had failed in Pakistan. Malaysia 
too initially suffered from fragmented clientelism, but was able in the early 1980s to 
overcome this constraint when political organizations were changed as a result of 
changes in the organization of power. The change in the political settlement enabled 
more centralized version of clientelism to emerge. Malaysia’s centralized clientelism 
of the 1980s, although it was still a costly system to run, allowed the implementation 
of a different type of learning strategy based on multinational companies with 
conditions and incentives for technology transfers and learning. These 
interdependencies between political stabilization strategies, learning strategies and 
asset transfer strategies are critical for devising feasible improvements in growth-
enhancing governance capabilities. Widening our range of case study knowledge will 
allow us to deepen our analytical understanding of these processes. 
 
Box 10 Political settlements can change 
 
If the organization of political power in political parties and patron-client 
networks is such that political stability can only be achieved by deploying 
patron-client networks that damage or limit growth, the country may be stuck in 
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low growth regardless of the quality of institutions and political leadership. But 
the situation need not be permanently hopeless. The solution in these cases may 
be a restructuring of political organizations and parties to change the patterns of 
stabilization. Malaysia in the early 1980s went through just such a 
transformation when the threat of civil war led to the emergence of a corporatist 
party structure in the form of the National Front government. This allowed its 
previously fragmented clientelism to be converted into a centralized form of 
clientelism. Redistribution through patron-client networks still happened, but 
the centralization of political redistribution allowed the state to prevent 
politically powerful constituencies from forging alliances with individual 
capitalists and protecting inefficiency. This in turn allowed technology 
acquisition strategies to be effectively implemented (Khan 2000a). These types 
of interdependencies between institutional capabilities and political constraints 
offer a better explanation of Asian takeoffs rather than the magical appearance 
of ‘political will’. Similar interdependences also explain the takeoffs in South 
Korea and Taiwan. Clearly, political reorganization of patron-client networks is 
not a task for donors or outsiders, but we can assist in providing analytical 
frameworks for debate and dialogue within developing countries. 
 
In our analysis of Asian rent seeking processes in Khan (2000a) we looked at how 
different patterns of patron-client networks helped us to understand why political 
stabilization in particular political settlements, specific technology acquisition 
strategies and non-market asset transfers led to different patterns of growth in Asian 
countries. These insights are likely to be very useful for Africa for a number of 
reasons. First, there is a large literature that claims that Africa is different in its 
susceptibility to patron-client politics, the rule of big men and the operation of neo-
patrimonialism (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Van de Walle 2003). But in fact, Africa is 
quite normal from a developing country perspective when we look at the Asian 
experience of patron-client politics.  
 
The problem in Africa is rather the weakness of some state institutions and the 
specific features of its patron-client networks. The average African country displays a 
greater fragmentation of patron-client networks, and a greater difficulty in imposing 
discipline on clients, not necessarily or only because of greater ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, but also because of less developed party organizations, weaker 
initial conditions in terms of very limited capitalist involvement in these networks and 
weaker state institutions disciplining and limiting predatory behaviour. In countries 
like Tanzania, where party organization is more developed, patron-client politics has a 
recognizably Asian pattern. In other words, if the removal of patron-client politics is 
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not a feasible strategy (figure 18), Africa would do well to focus its political reforms 
in learning to manage its patron-client networks better, rather than carry out political 
reforms that aim to do away with neo-patrimonialism but end up only weakening state 
capacities to manage these problems while patron-client politics continue to survive. 
We know that democratization has only strengthened patron-client politics in Africa, 
yet the response of many policy-makers is to increase the dosage of the same 
medicine rather than ask whether the solution may lie elsewhere (Chabal and Daloz 
1999).  
 
Secondly, improving our understanding of the Asian experience can also help to 
deepen our understanding of African development by looking at processes of 
accumulation and transformation through the lens of specific patterns of patron-client 
politics. Using our approach to Asian rent seeking, the task in specific African 
countries would be to map the patron-client networks that dominate politics and 
through which political stabilization has been achieved. These networks have allowed 
some types of social transformation to take place, as some African countries have also 
gone through types of property right transformations and accumulation that have 
enhanced productive capacity in some sectors. In other sectors, these patron-client 
networks have resulted in predatory or extortionate asset transfers and they have 
impeded the disciplining of technology acquisition strategies.  
 
The role of patron-client networks is clearly specific to particular countries and needs 
careful analysis. Only when we have country based analysis of this type can we 
suggest institutional and organizational changes that may allow faster and more 
effective social transformations, better and more effective political stabilization and 
feasible strategies of technology acquisition. In some cases, it may be that the 
underlying organization of political power is so detrimental that without a change in 
that distribution of power through the mobilization of new political forces (as in 
Malaysia in the early 1980s), not much can be done.  
 
A better understanding of patron-client networks is therefore critical for designing 
governance reform because these networks affect outcomes of all the major processes 
affecting the sustainability of growth and development. Our proposition is that the 
organization of patron-client networks is a useful lens through which to study 
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 i) the processes through which political stabilization is attempted and the likely 
outcomes in that context (figure 18),  
ii) the likelihood of disciplining different types of technology acquisition strategies in 
that context (figure 16), and  
iii) the likely outcomes of non-market asset transfers, as patron-client networks are 
important conduits through which non-market transfers are organized (figure 15).  
 
Research questions. The methodology I propose does not identify any simple killer 
variables that can explain why ‘political will’ emerges in a particular country to carry 
out transformative changes that lead to sustainable growth paths. Sustainable growth 
strategies can differ widely in terms of the mix of political stabilization expenditures, 
the pace and pattern of primitive accumulation, and the technology acquisition 
strategies followed. Success only requires that each of these processes is viable and 
achieves positive outcomes. Not everyone has to grow at Chinese or even South 
Korean rates to be successful. The problem is that when some or all of these processes 
in a particular country are not sustainable, high rates of growth can turn out to be a 
relatively brief ‘growth spurt’ rather than a sustainable growth path.  
 
Political stabilization exposes most transparently the patron-client networks in a 
country that are implicated in the two other processes that we have identified as 
important in judging the growth enhancing governance capabilities of a state. The 
juxtaposition of specific patron-client networks with the institutions of political 
stabilization, property right protection and technology acquisition provide critical 
information about the sustainability of each of these processes and allow us to reach a 
judgement about the growth-enhancing governance capabilities of the state. Given its 
political inheritance and economic problems, this approach can help us design 
somewhat better institutions and strategies to improve the sustainability of each of the 
processes that we believe are important for the sustainability of growth. 
 
Research and knowledge on these issues is still relatively thin despite many case 
studies on growth being available for different countries. Rodrik’s team working on 
the deep determinants of growth using analytical narratives is one of a very few 
groups working on consistent case studies (Rodrik 2003). However, their analytical 
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focus is different from ours, and while their case studies shed light on the analytical 
questions we identify, there is a pressing need for case studies to be designed to 
specifically answer the interdependent questions we are interested in. The analytical 
narrative approach can however be usefully expanded to look at the three 
interdependent processes that we have identified as important, using a number of 
comparative cases to initiate a broader case study approach to identify growth-
enhancing governance conditions. The selection of these countries would be from 
Asia and Africa to deepen our knowledge of Asian transformations and to apply these 
insights to begin a better mapping of African political economy. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The consensus development orthodoxy of the 1950s and 1960s did not adequately 
recognize that the successful implementation of catching-up strategies required a 
complementary set of governance capabilities. This is the problem we summarized in 
Figure 1. The very lucky presence of these capabilities in a small number of countries 
resulted in the dramatic success of a small number of East Asian countries at a time 
when all developing countries were following virtually the same policies. This could 
not be satisfactorily explained at the time, and resulted eventually in the abandonment 
of all catching up strategies in the second and third phase of development strategies 
(summarized in our Figure 2 and 3). We described the governance capabilities 
required for ensuring the effective implementation of growth-enhancing strategies as 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities, as opposed to the governance capabilities 
stressed in the good governance approach which we describe as market-enhancing 
governance capabilities. 
 
To the extent that productivity growth depends on better resource allocation, 
improving market efficiency is clearly desirable. But sustained productivity growth 
depends on the creation of new technologies or (in the case of developing countries), 
learning to use existing technologies effectively. Markets by themselves are not 
sufficient to ensure that productivity growth will be rapid unless appropriate 
incentives and compulsions exist to induce the creation of new technologies or the 
learning of old ones. While technical progress is possible along the trajectory set by a 
market-driven strategy, the climb up the technology ladder is likely to be slower 
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through diffusion and spontaneous learning compared to an active technology 
acquisition and learning strategy. Moreover, if technological learning is not 
sustainable, the market-driven strategy can result in divergence rather than 
convergence, as was the case when most developing countries followed free market 
strategies during their colonial periods.  
 
ur analysis suggests that growth outcomes depend on the compatibility of a growth 
he distinction between market-enhancing and growth-enhancing governance can 
does not matter that much for economic development.  
 
O
strategy with growth-enhancing governance capabilities. This approach also allows us 
to explain why many developing countries performed so poorly with growth strategies 
that appeared to be similar to the ones followed by successful East Asian countries. A 
growth strategy that cannot be implemented could well provide worse results than if 
there were no growth strategy at all because any growth strategy overrides some 
allocations that would otherwise have happened through the existing market system, 
thereby creating rents and rent seeking opportunities. If these rents fail to accelerate 
learning and instead result in large rent seeking costs, the economy would be worse 
off trying to implement these strategies. However, this is not necessarily a failure of 
the policy in general, but rather an indication of its inappropriateness in a particular 
country, or the failure of the country to address the necessary governance 
requirements that would be required to accelerate growth and achieve more rapid 
development.  
 
T
thus allow us to make sense of the complex comparative economic performance of 
countries since 1960, some of which is summarized in Table 10. It also allows us to 
reassert the importance of governance even though the types of governance that many 
institutional economists have focused on do not correlate very well with comparative 
economic performance. From a policy perspective our analysis points out the 
limitations of the current governance agenda that focuses almost exclusively on 
market-enhancing governance. The danger of such an exclusive focus on market-
enhancing governance is that we may lose opportunities for carrying out critical 
reforms that are more likely to produce results. We may also create disillusionment 
with governance reforms and the emergence of the false perception that governance 
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